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The above caption of this case contains the names of all parties to the proceeding
in the court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed. Throughout this brief, Madsen
will refer to the defendant and appellant as "Prudential."
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JURISDICTION
Appellate Jurisdiction to the Utah Supreme Court is conferred pursuant to § 78-22(3)0) of the Utah Code, The Utah Supreme Court has transferred the case to the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4). Accordingly, this Court now has jurisdiction
pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented for review:
1. If a bank holds pledged funds and secretly earns profits on those funds, what
statute of limitations, if any, applies?
The standard of review is one of correctness, since the trial court's application of
the statute of limitations presents a question of law. Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, ^f 4, 979
P.2d 823. This issue was preserved below at R. 2714-20, 3013-20, 6366, 7610-16,
12744-7.
2. In 1979, the Utah Legislature passed a new statute (§ 7-17-4). Did the new
statute (§ 7-17-4 U.C.A.) cut off class members' rights to profits earned on pledged
accounts after June 30, 1979?
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law the appellate court should
review for correctness. N.A.R. v Elmer, 2006 UT App. 293,14, 141 P.3d 606. This
issue was preserved at various places in the record, including R. 6872-76, 6975-84, 725864,9104-12, 10838-48.
3. Is Madsen entitled to compound interest during the time that Prudential earned
profits by using the pledged funds? If so, for what period of time would the

compounding continue? In the alternative, is Madsen entitled to prejudgment interest;
and if so, for what time period?
This issue presents a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Carlson
Distributing Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C, 2004 UT App 227, f 15, 95 P.3d 1171;
Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1991). This issue was preserved at R.
3034-43, 6456-9, 7982-3, 12229-35, 12700.
4. Was it proper for the trial court to eliminate, from the previously certified class,
duplexes, second homes, or commercial properties; even though the contract language
was the same as the Madsen contract?
Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in reducing the size of the
class is a legal question reviewed de novo. Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.,
331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2003). This issue is preserved below at R. 5026-31, 5210-15.
5. Should the Master be disqualified and all of this work vacated because of his ex
parte meetings with one party? And should the Master's work be vacated if it can be
shown that he (the Master) relied on work done by others, rather than doing the work
himself?
The standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion (perhaps as a
matter of law) in refusing to disqualify the Master and in adopting the Master's report.
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 742-3 (Utah 1990). If there was abuse of discretion, this
Court "must vacate the order unless the error was hamiless." Id. at 741. "The standard
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for determining harmless error is whether it is reasonably likely that the trial court's final
order would have been different absent the master's improper activities." Id. at 744.
6. Because Prudential has not provided an acceptable accounting, in a case that is
32 years old, should this Court simplify matters and order that damages be calculated
using the passbook savings rate of interest?
This issue is one for the appellate court only, and hence is a question of law.
Simper v. Scorup, 78 Utah 71,1 P.2d 941 (1931).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
STATUTES, ETC., TO BE INTERPRETED
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-34, states:
To actions brought, to recover money or other property
deposited with any bank, trust company or savings or loan
corporation, association or society there is no limitation. (Emphasis
added.)
Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-4(1):
(1)

A lender not requiring the establishment and maintenance of a
reserve account shall offer the borrower the following options:
(a)
The borrower may elect to maintain a non-interest-bearing
reserve account to be serviced by the lender at no charge to
the borrower; or
(b)
The borrower may manage the payment of insurance
premiums, taxes and other charges for his own account.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Madsen purchased a home in 1964. In order to finance the purchase, Madsen
borrowed $16,800 from Prudential Federal Savings and Loan. The trust deed provided in
part:

3

In addition to the monthly payments as provided in said note,
the TRUSTOR agrees to pay to the beneficiary, upon the same day
each month, budget payments estimated to equal one-twelfth of the
annual taxes and insurance premiums; said budget payments to be
adjusted from time to time as required, and said budget payments are
hereby pledged to the BENEFICIARY as additional security for the
full performance of this deed of trust and the note secured hereby.
(R. 5.) (Emphasis added.)
Madsen claims that Prudential invested the "pledged" funds and earned a profit.
(R. 931.) Madsen sued for an accounting of the profits. The lawsuit was filed as a class
action, and the class was certified.
Early in the case, the trial court granted a summary judgment for Prudential
dismissing the case. Thus followed the first appeal, Madsen v. Prudential Federal
Savings & Loan Assn., 558 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977)1 (included herein as Ex. A.) In
Madsen /, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded. The Utah
Supreme Court held, inter alia, that:
The pledgee has the duty to account to the pledgor for the
increase or profits accruing to the pledgee as a result of the
possession of the pledged chattel. Id. at 1340.
After the decision in Madsen I (above), Prudential removed the case to federal
court. The federal court dismissed the action. Madsen appealed. Madsen v. Prudential
Federal Savings & Loan Ass Jn, 635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980).2 (Included herein as
Ex. B.) In Madsen II, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held inter alia that:

1

Hereafter Madsen I

2

Hereafter Madsen II.
4

Since no federal controversy was disclosed on the face
of the Madsens' state court complaint, as amended, removal
was improper and the consolidated case must be remanded to
state court. Id. at 803.
After remand to the trial court, Judge Rigtrup held a bench trial. At the conclusion
of the trial, Judge Rigtrup entered a verbal bench ruling in favor of Madsen. After the
verbal bench ruling was issued (but before written findings could be entered) Prudential
claimed that Judge Rigtrup was biased and should be disqualified. The presiding judge
agreed and dismissed the case. Madsen appealed. Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings
and Loan Ass'n, 161 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988).3 (Included herein as Ex. C.) The Utah
Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
After the case was remanded, Judge Rigtrup entered written Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. (Included herein as Ex. D.) As part of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (Ex. D.), Judge Rigtrup ruled inter alia that:
10.

Prudential should be ordered to pay to Madsen the sum of
$134.70 for profits or earnings Prudential has realized by
using Madsen5 s "budget" payments for the period of March 3,
1971 to June 30, 1979.
* * *

12.

All class issues are reserved for further proceedings.
(R. 3003).

After remand, the trial court appointed a Master. The Master filed his final report,
dated March 1, 2002. (R. 10370-2, included herein as Ex. G.) As part of his final report
(Ex. G), the Master concluded that there were 9,547 class members; and that the average

Hereafter Madsen III.
5

damages per class member would be $105.18; resulting in a total judgment for all class
members of $1,004,153. (R. 10371.) Based upon the Master's Report, the trial court
entered a Final Judgment of $1,004,153 for the entire class. (R. 13842-3, included herein
as Ex. I.)
Madsen appealed the trial court's Final Judgment. (R. 13850-83.) As part of this
appeal, Madsen claims that the computation of damages by the Master should have been
higher; and that the Master failed to account for all class members.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts relevant to this appeal are set forth in the Findings of Fact entered by
Judge Rigtrup. (See R. 2997-3001, Ex. D.) For purposes of this appeal, Madsen does not
challenge any of the Findings entered by Judge Rigtrup. (Ex. D.) However, Madsen does
challenge computations included in the Master's Report of March 1, 2002 (Ex. G herein).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Since this case deals with funds that were on deposit with a bank or savings and
loan corporation, there is no statute of limitations. § 78-12-34, Utah Code Ann.
Consequently, Madsen should have been awarded the profits earned from the time the
deposit was made in 1964. At the very least, since the deposit was made pursuant to a
contractual requirement, Madsen is entitled to the profits accruing during the six years
immediately prior to the filing of this action in 1975.
In 1979, the Legislature passed the Interest on Mortgage Loan Accounts Act. Utah
Code Ann. § 7-17-1, et seq. And Judge Rigtrup cut off damages as of 1979 because of
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the Act. However, that Act did not apply to any action filed before 1979. Furthermore,
Prudential did not comply with the terms of the Act; and the mandate of the 1977
Supreme Court decision had already established the law of the case in this matter.
Prejudgment interest is appropriate in this case because the amount of the pledge is
"ascertainable at any given time," and evidence was presented which enabled the
calculation of damages.
The class in this case was initially certified to include all borrowers having
identical contract provisions with respect to money pledged for the payment of taxes and
insurance. Late in the case, Judge Rigtrup removed duplexes, second homes and
commercial properties from the class. By narrowing the definition of the certified class,
the trial court not only violated the mandate, but dismissed a subclass without any notice
to the members of the class.
The conclusions of the Master should be disregarded because the Master has stated
that more testing needs to be done; thus, the Master's Report is not yet fmishedl.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT IS BOUND TO FOLLOW THE MANDATE OF
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
As stated in the Introduction, this case has been to the Utah Supreme Court on two
prior occasions. (See Ex. A and Ex. C.) Many of the issues before the Court on this
appeal have already been decided on the two prior appeals. Under the doctrine of "law of
the case/' this Court is bound by the mandates of those two prior decisions.
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Law of the case terminology has been applied to a number of
distinct sets of problems, each with a separate analysis. One branch
of the doctrine, often called the mandate rule, dictates that
pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in a case
become the law of the case and must be followed in subsequent
proceedings of that case, [citations omitted.] The lower court must
not depart from the mandate, and any change with respect to the
legal issues governed by the mandate must be made by the appellate
court that established it [viz. the Utah Supreme Court] or by a court
to which it, in turn, owes obedience, [citations omitted.] In addition,
the lower court must implement both the letter and the spirit of the
mandate, taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the
circumstances it embraces.
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037-8 (1995). The truth is that this case
is over 30 years old; and the record is thousands and thousands of pages long.
Nevertheless, this brief can be relatively short because most of the issues have already
been decided in Madsen I and Madsen III.
POINT II
ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT,
THERE IS NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THIS CASE

A. BACKGROUND
Madsens took out their home loan in 1964. (Finding of Fact ^f 1.) (R. 2997. See
Ex. D herein.) The complaint in this case was filed on March 3, 1975. (R. 1.) The trial
court applied the four-year statute of limitations pursuant to § 78-12-25 (3), Utah Code
Ann. ("An action may be brought within four years for relief not otherwise provided for
by law."). Therefore, the trial court allowed damages from 1975 (date of complaint) back
to 1971 (four-year statute of limitations) even though Madsen had been making the same
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loan payments since 1964. (R. 2997-8.) Or stated in other words. Prudential was allowed
tnjTQcket all of the profits on the pledged funds for the period of 1964 to 1971.
This issue was preserved below at R. 2714-20, 3013-20, 6366, 7610-16, 12744-7.
B. THERE IS NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR MONEY "DEPOSITED"
IN A BANK
Madsen claims that the applicable statute of limitations should have been § 78-1234,4 Utah Code Ann. which states:
To actions brought, to recover money or other property
deposited with any bank, trust company or savings or loan
corporation, association or society there is no limitation. (Emphasis
added.)
As noted, above, the statute turns on the word "deposit." If Madsen's pledged
funds were construed to be a "deposit," § 78-12-34 (above) would apply, and damages
would go all the way back to 1964. However, Judge Rigtrup rejected plaintiffs claim
that the pledged funds were a "deposit." At Conclusion of Law f 9 (R. 3003, Ex. D
herein) Judge Rigtrup held that:
The "budget55 account is not a "bank deposit55 within the
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-34.
But, the Utah Supreme Court has previously made a ruling on this specific issue.
In Madsen I, our Supreme Court concluded that Madsen5s pledged funds were a
"deposit.55

4

This statute was rescinded in 1981. However, this case was six years old by that
time. Thus, the 1981 statute should apply. See e g Merz v. Seaman, 697 N.Y.S.2d 290
(1999) and 51 Am.Jur.2d, Limitations of Actions, § 47.
9

A deposit5 of money as security for the performance of a
contract has been recognized as a valid pledge.
Madsen /, 558 P.2d at 1339. (Emphasis and footnote added.)
In short, the Utah Supreme Court has determined in this case that Madsen's
monthly "pledge" was a "deposit." That mandate is binding on this Court. Since each
monthly payment was a "deposit," the statute of limitations regarding "deposit" (§ 78-1234 above) should apply.
However, if this Court concludes that Madsen's pledge was not a "deposit" (see
above), the Court should consider the case of Conner v. Smith, 51 Utah 129, 169 P. 158,
160 (1917). Conner analyzes statute of limitations issues for a "pledge." The Conner
court held that:
When property is held by the pledgee as security, he cannot assert
that he holds it adversely to the pledgor, and thereby acquire a right
to it under the statute of limitations.
C. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING
The standard of review is the one of correctness, because the trial court's
application of a statute of limitations presents a question of law. Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT
52,14, 979P.2d823.

5

Compare Hercules Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2000 UT App 372, f 9, 21
P.3d 231 ("When a statute fails to define a word, we rely on the dictionary .. .") with
Webster }s Third New International Dictionary (the word deposit defined inter alia as
"something given as a pledge"). Also the Oxford American College Dictionary (2002)
defines the word deposit inter alia "a sum payable as . . . a pledge for a contract."
10

Since determining the applicable statute of limitations is purely a legal issue, there
is no requirement to marshal evidence. If marshaling is nevertheless appropriate,
Prudential may make the factual assertion that the pledge was never deposited into any
identifiable account. (R. 2998.) Madsen concedes that fact. Based on this fact,
Prudential may argue that the pledge could not be deemed a deposit.
POINT III
ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT,
IF ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES, IT WOULD BE
THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE
A. BACKGROUND
Madsen has argued in POINT II above, that there is no statute of limitations for
this case. If the Court agrees with POINT II, the Court may skip this POINT III.
However, if this Court disagrees with POINT II, above, the Court should next consider
this POINT III.
This issue was preserved at R. 7610-11.
B. IF ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES. IT WOULD BE THE SIXYEAR STATUTE
As noted in POINT II above, Judge Rigtrup applied a four-year statute of
limitations pursuant to § 78-12-25(2) Utah Code Ann. ("An action . . . for relief not
otherwise provided for by law"). However, if any statute of limitations applies (see Point
II above), Judge Rigtrup should have applied the six-year statute of limitations.
Specifically, § 78-12-23 Utah Code Ann. provides:

11

An action may be brought within six years . . . upon any contract,
obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing . . .
(Emphasis added.)
The next step is to compare § 78-12-23 (cited above) with the mandate of the Supreme
Court in Madsen /which states:
This action is founded on a deed of trust and was brought to
determine the . . . legal consequences pursuant to such terms.
(Emphasis added.)
558P.2dat 1338.
In summary, the mandate of the Supreme Court clearly and specifically holds that
"this action" was "founded" on "an instrument in writing" (viz. the trust deed). Thus
Judge Rigtrup violated both the letter and the spirit of the mandate by not applying the
six-year statute of limitations.
C. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING
The standard of review is one of correctness, because the trial court's application
of a statute of limitations present a question of law. Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, ^[4, 979
P.2d823.
As stated above, there should be no need to marshal evidence on the legal issue of
the applicable statute of limitations. But if marshaling is required, Prudential may argue
that there is nothing in the contract which explicitly requires Prudential to pay the interest,
earnings, or profits it derived from the pledge. (R. 152.) Prudential may go on to argue
that there was, therefore, no contractual breach.

12

POINT IV
ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT,
IT WAS AN ERROR OF LAW FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
END DAMAGES AS OF 1979
A. BACKGROUND
Madsens took out their home loan in 1964. The duration of the loan was for 25
years (or until 1989). This lawsuit was filed in 1975. Or stated in other words, this
lawsuit seeks damages for the period of 1964 to 1989.
However, the trial court cut off damages for the period from 1964 to 1971. See
Points II and III above. The trial court also cut off damages for the period 1979 to 1989.
This Point IV deals with damages from 1979 to 1989.
In 1979 (two years after the Court's decision in Madsen I) the Utah Legislature
passed a new statute titled the Interest on Mortgage Loan Accounts Act (§ 7-17-1 et seq.
U.C.A.) There have been some amendments since the original 1979 act. A copy of the
act as amended by 1985 (the date of the trial below) is included as Exhibit J.
Section 4 of the original act states as follows:
(1)
A lender not requiring the establishment and maintenance of a
reserve account shall offer the borrower the following options:
(a)

The borrower may elect to maintain a non-interest-bearing
reserve account6 to be serviced by the lender at no charge to
the borrower; or

6

§ 7-17-2(5) defines "reserve account" as follows: "'Reserve account' means any
account, whether denominated . . . pledge . . . or otherwise . . . whereby the borrower
agrees to make periodic prepayment to the lender . . [of] taxes, insurance premiums or
other charges . . ."
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(b)

The borrower may manage the payment of insurance
premiums, taxes and other charges for his own account.

Pursuant to the above statute, Prudential sent a form letter to Madsen and other
class members in July of 1979. That form letter states:
NOTICE TO HOMEOWNER
RESERVE ACCOUNTS FOR PAYMENT OF TAXES AND INSURANCE
As of July 1, 1979, Prudential Federal Savings will no longer require
a reserve account in conjunction with your mortgage loan for the
payment of real estate property taxes, insurance premiums, or other
charges. You may now choose one of the following two options:
A.

You may continue your monthly payment as is now provided
for in your loan documents to be deposited in a non interest
bearing reserve account. We will continue to provide you the
service of paying your property taxes and/or insurance
premiums at no cost as they become due; or,

B.

You may elect to assume the legal responsibility for the
payment of these assessments and pay your own real estate
property taxes, insurance premiums and other charges as they
become due.

If you choose Option A, no response is necessary. We will continue
to provide the services of paying these assessments without cost to
you. If you choose Option B, the enclosed card must be signed and
returned to our office by September 1, 1979.
(R. 3007.) (Emphasis added.)
In summary, based upon the letter (above) and based upon § 7-17-4 (above) Judge
Rigtmp cut off damages as of July of 1979 even though Madsen and other class members
continued to pay pledged funds for several years after 1979. Thus Conclusion of Law ]f f
states:
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Damages terminate on June 30, 1979 by reason of Utah Code Ann.
§ 7-17-4. (R. 3002, Ex. D herein)
This issue was preserved, inter alia, at R. 6872-76, 6975-84, 7258-64, 9104-12,
10838-48.
B. BY ITS OWN TERMS. THE STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE
INSTANT LAWSUIT.
As described above, the legislature passed a new statute in 1979 (Interest on
Mortgage Loan Accounts Act). Based upon § 7-17-4 of that Act, Judge Rigtrup cut off
damages as of 1979. (See Conclusion of Law | 5, R. 3002.) However, § 7-17-10 of the
Act states:
The provisions of this act shall apply:
(1) to all reserve accounts; and
(2) to all actions filed after January 1,1979, to recover interest
on or other compensation for the use of the funds on any reserve
account whether or not the reserve accounts were established
prior to or subsequent to July 1,1979, (Emphasis added.)
Thus, according to the specific language of the statute (above), the act only applies
to actions filed after January 1, 1979. But, the instant lawsuit was filed in 1975, four
years prior to that 1979 deadline. Thus, the act cannot apply. See Andreason v Felsted,
2006UTApp 188,^11, 137 P.3dl:
When we engage in statutory interpretation, "we are compelled to
give the statutory language meaning and to assume that each term in
the statute was used advisedly." (Citation omitted.)
The case of Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995) is also
on point:
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Clearly, the first and last sentences of [the statute] are patently
inconsistent. . . . This Court will not construe a statute in such a
way as to render certain viable parts meaningless and void.
If this Court goes beyond the plain words of the statute to examine the legislative
history/ the court will be squarely faced with the comments of the sponsor of the bill:
It is very clear and this has been established in the Senate and the
argument is without doubt that the Madsen case is not included in
this . . . The Madsen suit is not encumbered in any way. It can go
ahead with logical conclusion. We don't wish to interfere with that.
Legislative Proceedings on Senate Bill 85, Vol. II, 2/14/79, p.19. (R. 3271-2.)
In summary, Madsen's rights to damages after 1979 could not be cut off by
§ 7-17-4 Utah Code Ann. because that statute only applies to "actions filed after June 1,
1979." But, this lawsuit was filed in 1975.
C. PRUDENTIAL CANNOT RELY ON THE STATUTE BECAUSE
PRUDENTIAL DID NOT DEPOSIT MADSEN'S PAYMENTS INTO A
"NON-INTEREST BEARING" ACCOUNT
Turning again to the letter sent by Prudential to Madsen and other class members
(R. 3007, If A above), the letter reads in part:
You may continue your monthly payment as is now provided for in
your loan document to be deposited in a noninterest bearing account.
(Emphasis added.)
But, did Prudential really "deposit" the money "in a non-interest bearing account"
as promised by Prudential's letter? The analysis begins with Judge Rigtrup's Finding of
Fact f 5, which states that:

7

See Utah Dept of Environmental Quality v Wind River Petroleum, 881 P'.2d
869, 872-3 (Utah 1994).
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Upon receiving each monthly payment, Prudential
immediately deposited the entire check into its general operating
account. (R. 2998.) (Emphasis added.) (See Ex. D.)
Madsen hired an expert witness, Andrew Carr Conway. Mr. Conway has
impeccable credentials. He is a Certified Fraud Examiner, a Certified Financial
Investigator, and a Certified Public Accountant. (See R. 11883-4.) Mr. Conway has had
thirty years of experience with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Internal
Revenue Service. Mr. Conway's testimony8 on the issue is as follows:
I have examined a form letter which was sent by Prudential in July of
1979 to persons who had borrowed money from Prudential to
purchase homes (class members). . . . I have also examined a
document titled Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (March
22, 1990).
* # #

Based on the above documents and my review of the 1990 Annual
Report for Olympus Capital Corporation (a consolidated entity
including Prudential), it is my opinion, as a cash management issue,
and as an accounting matter related to the classification of restricted
cash, Prudential did not deposit the funds designated for taxes
and insurance with Madsen's monthly payments into a "noninterest bearing reserve account" after July 1, 1979 (as promised
in the July 1979 letter). Rather, (contrary to the representations in
the 1979 form letter,) after July 1, 1979, until at least May 22, 1990
(the date that Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed)
Prudential deposited Madsen's monthly "budget payment" into
Prudential's general operating account and Prudential invested
surplus funds from the general operating account at a profit.
(R. 11876-9.) (Emphasis added.)

8

Prudential filed a Motion to Strike the Conway Affidavit. In response, Judge
Dever ruled that "Mr. Conway's statements on accounting procedures [are] allowed, the
remaining portions in the Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit are striken. (R. 1277L)
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The summary of all the above is that Prudential's form letter ( | A above)
promised to "deposit" the prepayments for taxes and insurance into a "non-interest
bearing account." But that was a lie. Prudential did not deposit the money into a "noninterest bearing account." Rather, Prudential deposited the money in its "general
operating account," and Prudential invested surplus funds from this account to earn a
profit. See Conway Affidavit above. See also Finding of Fact ^ 9 (R. 2999, Ex. D.
herein).
It is also important to note that the statute required Prudential to advise class
members that the form letter was sent out "pursuant to this Act." [viz. pursuant to §7-174(2).] Of course, Prudential's form letter does not advise class members that the letter
was sent "pursuant" to § 7-17-1 et seq. (See ^f A above.) Therefore, class members did
not have any opportunity to refer to the statute in order to clarify any ambiguity.
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which the appellate court should
review for correctness. N.A.R., Inc. v. Elmer, 2006 UT App 293, ft, 141 P.3d 606.
The only factual issue may involve Conway's statement (above) that Prudential did
not deposit the pledge into a non-interest bearing account. However, there is no contrary
fact evidence to marshal. Prudential merely argued that Conway's affidavit should not be
considered because of technical considerations, for example, that it contained legal
conclusions. R. 12014. Prudential went on to assert that the affidavit was irrelevant, in
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that it addressed "Prudential's internal accounting procedures." R. 12023. Prudential
thus acknowledged that this statement does not present a relevant factual issue.
POINT V
ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT,
PRUDENTIAL MUST PAY PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST
A. BACKGROUND
The Master computed the "net" profits which Prudential had realized by investing
Madsen5s pledged funds. The trial court awarded Madsen those cumulative earnings for
the years 1971 to 1979. However, the trial court refused to grant any prejudgment interest
on those amounts. (See Conclusions of Law, ^ 10 and 13, R. 3003, at Ex. D. herein.)
This issue is preserved at R. 3034-43, 6456-7, 7982-3, 12229-35, 12700.
B. TRIAL COURT RULINGS
Judge Rigtrup awarded prejudgment interest often percent on the damage award
from the date of the trial (1985) to the date of the entry of judgment (2006) (R 3003,
Ex. D herein at <[| 13 ) However, Judge Rigtrup refused to grant any prejudgment interest
for the years prior to 1985 because:
Plaintiffs shall not be allowed interest for any time prior to trial, for
the reasons that the damages were not calculable before trial, that
damage calculation at trial was subject to divergent evidence and
viewpoints, especially between the parties' expert witnesses, that
damages required a determination by the Court and that the Court
was required to select one method of calculation from among several
alternatives presented by the experts.
R. 3003-4, Exhibit D herein at f 13.
However, at a much later date, Judge Stirba ruled that:
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Judge Rigtrup's award to plaintiffs of the simple interest at the
annual rate of 10% on damages from the date of the conclusion of
trial but prior to the entry of judgment, is hereby vacated on the
ground a judgment is entered when the judgment is actually signed
and entered, and an award of prejudgment [interest] is, therefore,
inappropriate.
Order of January 20, 1998 (R. 6794, Ex. F).
In summary, based upon the rulings of Judge Rigtrup and Judge Stirba, no
prejudgment interest was awarded.
C. ARGUMENT
The law on prejudgment interest has been stated as follows:
A prejudgment interest award is proper when "the damage is
complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the
amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time."
Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 Utah App. 5, f 24, 994 P.2d 817, 823. (Emphasis added.)
Turning now to the mandate of the Supreme Court, in this very case, we find the
following language:
]I]t [is] of no consequence that the amount of [Madsen's pledge]
may vary during the existence of the pledge. The amount is
ascertainable at any given time, and thus the lien is perfected as to
amount.
Madsen I dit 1339. (Emphasis added.)
Or, stated in other words, the Supreme Court has concluded in this very case that
the amount of the pledge is "ascertainable at any given time." See Madsen I. Since the
amount of the pledge is "ascertainable at any given time," the Lefavi test (above) is
satisfied, and prejudgment interest should be awarded.
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D. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING
"A trial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a question
of law which we [the appellate court] review for correctness. Carlson Distributing Co v.
Salt Lake Brewing Co. L.C, 2004 UTApp 227, fl5, 15P.3d 1171.
An issue of law needs no marshaling. But should marshaling be appropriate,
Prudential would probably rely on Judge Rigtrup's factual characterization (see quote on
p. 19). 9
POINT VI

ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT
DAMAGES SHOULD BE COMPOUNDED AND THE COMPOUNDING
SHOULD CONTINUE TO THE PRESENT DAY
A. BACKGROUND
The trial court allowed damages from 1971 to 1979.10 During this window of 1971
to 1979, the trial court computed separate damages for each year, and the Court
compounded the interest each year from 1971 to 1979. No compound interest was
allowed after 1979. (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at Ex. D herein.)
This issue is preserved at R. 6457-9.
9

However, Judge Rigtrup incorrectly applied the law to these facts. See Smith v.
Fairfax Realty, 2003 UT 41, 82 P.3d 1064 ("Where, as here, damages were complete as
of the day the property was transferred to the REIT and the jury based its award of
damages on competent testimony from an appraiser who used generally accepted
principles in determining the market value of the real property, an award of prejudgment
interest is appropriate.'5)
10

Madsen has argued in Point II and III above that the trial court should have
allowed damages prior to 1971 and Madsen has argued in Point IV, above, that the trial
court should have allowed damages after 1979.
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B. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN COMPOUNDING DAMAGES
FROM 1971 TO 1979
According to the mandate of the Supreme Court in this case:
[Tjhe secured party may hold as additional security any increase or
profits (except money) received from the collaterals, but money so
received, unless remitted to the debtor, shall be applied in reduction
of the secured obligation . . .
Madsen I at 1340. (Emphasis added.)
But Prudential violated the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court by failing to apply profits
from the pledged funds "in reduction of the secured obligation."
In short, Prudential earned a double profit from Madsen's pledged funds. First
Prudential earned a "profit" by investing Madsen's pledged funds. But Prudential earned
a second profit by failing to reduce the overall loan balance by the profits earned on
Madsen's pledged funds. Since Prudential was earning a double profit on Madsen's
pledged funds, the remedy is to award Madsen compound interest. Thus, in Finding of
Fact f 14, the trial court ruled:
The Court finds it appropriate under the facts of this case to
compound on an annual basis. The Court finds that Prudential must
disgorge these compounded profits in order to make Madsen whole.
(R. 2999.)
The case of Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d 571, 577 (1950) is
in accord. The Farnsworth court stated:
If defendants had paid plaintiff the interest when due, he could have
reloaned it to them, or could have loaned it to any one else . . . The
plaintiff therefore was as much entitled to interest upon the unpaid
interest as though it had been paid to him when due and he had
reloaned it.. . (Emphasis in original.)
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Comment 207(2) to the Restatement of Trusts (1959) leads to a similar result:
If the trustee uses trust funds in his own business and it does not
appear how much he has earned thereon, he is ordinarily chargeable
with compound interest on the ground that he probably received a
return from the trust fund so used at least equal to compound
interest.
C. COMPOUND INTEREST SHOULD ALSO BE AWARDED FOR THE
YEARS 1964 TO 1971
Madsen has argued in Point II above that damages should also have been awarded
from 1964 to 1971. For reasons stated, above, any damages awarded from 1964 to 1971
should likewise be compounded.
D. COMPOUND INTEREST SHOULD ALSO BE AWARDED FOR YEARS
AFTER 1979
Madsen has argued in Point IV above that damages should also have been awarded
after 1979. For reasons stated above, any damages awarded after 1979 should likewise be
compounded.
E. COMPOUNDING OF OLD DAMAGES SHOULD CONTINUE AFTER 1979
EVEN IF THE COURT DOES NOT AWARD NEW DAMAGES AFTER
1979
According to the trial court, Prudential owed Madsen $134.70 as of 1979. But
according to the trial court, Prudential still owes Madsen the same $134.70 as of 2006.
The problem is that the trial court has not followed the mandate of the Supreme Court.
According to the Supreme Court, Prudential should have reduced Madsen's
mortgage balance by $134.70 as of 1979. (See f B above.) Of course, if Madsen's
mortgage balance had been reduced by $134.70 in 1979, the loan would have been paid
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off earlier and Madsen's interest payments after 1979 would have been less. Or stated in
other words, Prudential has continued to earn profits on Madsen's $134.70 from 1979 to
2006. But according to the mandate of the Supreme Court, profits earned on the $134.70
belong to Madsen. The only remedy is to allow the interest on the $134.70 to compound
each year from 1979 until the judgment is paid.
F. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING
Issues regarding interest are conclusions of law which should be reviewed for
correctness. No particular deference should be paid to the trial court rulings. Christensen
v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1991).
Issues of law do not require marshaling. If marshaling is appropriate, the only fact
issue would seem to be whether Prudential has ever reduced Madsen's loan balance by
the annual earnings on the pledged funds. (See p. 22 above.) Madsen is aware of no facts
to support such a contention.
POINT VII
ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REMOVING DUPLEXES, SECOND HOMES,
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, ETC. FROM THE CLASS
A. BACKGROUND
On June 14, 1977, Judge Croft certified a class consisting of
[A] 11 persons who are presently parties to trust deed contracts with
defendant wherein the contract provides that:
* * *

"In addition to the monthly payments as provided in said note, the
trustor agrees to pay to the beneficiary, upon the same day each
month, budget payments estimated to equal one-twelfth of the annual
taxes and insurance premiums; said budget payments to be adjusted
24

from time to time as required, and said budget payments are hereby
pledged to the beneficiary as additional security for the full
performance of this deed of trust and the note secured thereby. . . ."
(R. 640.) (Emphasis added.)
On September 3, 1985, Judge Rigtrup reconfirmed Judge Croft's class certification
order above. Specifically, Judge Rigtrup ruled that:
[T]he memorandum decision of Judge Croft dated June 14, 1977, is
hereby reconfirmed. (R. 2027.)
However, in December 1996, Judge Rigtrup narrowed the class definition.
Specifically, the Court stated:
The Court will certify as to class . . . single family, owner- occupied
residential primary residence borrowers . . . (R. 5522.)
According to Judge Rigtrup's 1996 revision, duplexes, tri-plexes, second homes (or
cabins) and corporate owned homes were excluded.
Judge Rigtrup's rationale for narrowing the class (as described above) was that:
My reasoning between the non-occupied or commercial kinds of
loans is where they are either holding rental property or apartments
or commercial kinds of loans, they may have an interest to go back
and borrow more money. And so they'd be concerned with the
relationship with Prudential in terms of being able to go back to in
the well. A homeowner probably isn't really going to consider it
because you are trying to get the best deal you can and buy yourself a
home. (R. 5523.)
This issue is preserved at R. 5026-31, 5210-15.
B. THERE IS NO CASELAW TO SUPPORT JUDGE RIGTRUP'S
NARROWING OF THE CLASS
Neither Judge Rigtrup nor Prudential has ever cited a single case which holds that
a court can exclude some parties from a class on the guess that they might not want to be
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part of the class action. To the contrary, see e.g. Lanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 1349, 1357
(10th Cir. 1981): "It is not fatal if some members of the class might prefer not to have
violations of their rights remedied." (Internal quotations omitted.)
C. ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT, OWNERS
OF DUPLEXES. SECOND HOMES AND COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES
SHOULD BE PART OF THE CLASS BECAUSE THEY SIGNED
IDENTICAL CONTRACTS.
Again, the answer to this question is found by turning to the mandate of the Utah
Supreme Court. According to that mandate:
The action is founded upon terms of a deed of trust; and was
brought to determine the status of the parties, and the legal
consequences pursuant to such terms. (Emphasis added.)
Madsen I, 558 P.2d at 1338.
And according to the mandate of the Supreme Court, the "legal consequences" of the
Madsen contract are as follows:
If from the use of the property pledged profits are derived, the
pledgee [Prudential] m u s t . . . account therefor to the pledgor.
(Emphasis added.)
Id., 558P.2dat 1340.
The point is that the Utah Supreme Court has now issued a mandate which has
construed the terms of a specific contract; and approximately 10,000 Utah citizens had an
identical contract with Prudential. According to the above mandate Prudential must
account to each pledgor if the pledgor has a contract identical to the Madsen
contract. In summary, Judge Rigtrup failed to follow the mandate of the Utah Supreme
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Court when he excluded duplexes and other commercial properties from the class - even
though they had signed identical contracts.
As a final matter, Rule 23(e) U.R.C.P provides that:
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without
approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs. (Emphasis added.)
The above Rule ties in with Rule 23(c)(4)(B), which states:
When appropriate . . . a class may be divided into subclasses and
each subclass treated as a class.
In effect, Judge Rigtrup created a separate subclass of homeowners who lived in
duplexes, or other commercial properties. Then, twenty years after the class was
certified, Judge Rigtrup dismissed the entire subclass without sending the notice required
by Rule 23(e) (above).
Suppose that a duplex owner had received a letter from the court explaining that
duplexes had been dismissed from the class. At that point the duplex owner could have
filed a separate and independent action to collect or the duplex owner might have filed a
motion to intervene. But, because there was no notice from the court, duplex owners had
no opportunity to protect themselves.
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING
Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in reaching its decision
on class certification is a legal question reviewed de novo. Parker v Time Warner
Entertainment Co , 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2003).
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There is no need to marshal evidence pertaining to a legal issue. However, should
marshaling need to be addressed, there is no evidence in the record supporting the factual
basis Judge Rigtrup gave (see ^f A above) for his decision to narrow the class.
POINT VIII
THE MASTER SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED AND
ALL OF HIS WORK VACATED

A. BACKGROUND
The trial, conducted by Judge Rigtrup, computed damages only for Madsens,
individually. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at Preamble and Conclusion
Tf 12, R. 2994, 3003.) (See Ex. D. herein.) After the trial was completed, the trial court
appointed a Special Master. The job of the Master was to compute damages for all class
members. Over a period of approximately ten years, the Master issued various
preliminary reports. (R. 4068-71, 5384-7, 9339-55.) The Master's final report was
issued on March 1, 2002 (Rl 0370-72 and Ex. G herein); and the Final Judgment was
based entirely11 on that March 1, 2002 Report.
This issue was preserved at R. 9645-51, 10462-4.

11

The Final Judgment entered on December 13, 2004 states in part: "[PJursuant
to the Master's Fifth Report. . . judgment is entered . . . in the amount of
$1,004,153.00 .. r (R. 13429.) (Emphasis added.) cf. Final Judgment, entered June 1,
2006. (R. 13842. See Ex. I.)
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B. THE MASTER SECRETLY GAVE HIS REPORT TO PRUDENTIAL
BEFORE THE REPORT WAS GIVEN TO MADSEN OR THE COURT
James Loebbecke was a member of the Board of Directors of Prudential (then
Olympus Bank) up until 1985. After 1985, James Loebbecke became the designated
expert witness for Prudential.
In the course of discovery it became apparent that Mr. Loebbecke was involved in
at least three ex parte meetings with the Master (Ed Erickson). (R. 9657-63.)
Several courts have disqualified a Master based upon such ex parte meetings. See
e.g. Plumb v State, 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990); Cobell v Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); and Jenkins v Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
But the instant case is much stronger than Plumb, Cobell and Jenkins, and other
similar ex parte cases. In Plumb, Cobell, and Jenkins, we simply know that ex parte
meetings were held; however, nothing is known about what happened at those ex parte
meetings. But, in the instant case, we know what happened during the ex parte meeting
between the Master (Ed Erickson) and James Loebbecke (Prudential's expert witness).
Specifically, we know that the Master (Ed Erickson) made a private deal to show his
report to James Loebbecke (Prudential's expert witness) before the report was given to
Madsen's attorney or the Judge. After one of those ex parte meetings, Mr. Loebbecke
made the following hand written notes:
Ed [Erickson - The Master] will draft his findings for a meeting with
attorneys. Will share with me first.
(Emphasis added.) (R. 9672.)
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Why would the Master show his report to Prudential's expert witness (Loebbecke)
before he showed the report to Madsen's attorney or to the Judge? Was the Master doing
a special favor for Prudential? Did the Master have special friends at Prudential? Did
Prudential make some secret promises to the Master? Of course, no one will ever know.
But the public can have no confidence in such secret meetings and private deals between
Prudential and the Master.
The above conduct also squarely violates Rule 53(e)(5), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure which states:
Before filing his report a master may submit a draft thereof to
counsel for all parties [not the expert witness for one of the parties]
for the purpose of receiving their suggestions. (Emphasis added.)
C. THE MASTER HAS NEVER EVEN SEEN THE BASIC DOCUMENTS
WHICH FORM THE FOUNDATION FOR HIS REPORT AND THE
FOUNDATION FOR THE FINAL JUDGMENT
On January 2, 2002, the Court entered the following Order:
The Master shall, within 60 days of this order, produce to the Court a
report giving the Master's final statistical calculation of aggregate
class damages. (R. 10201.)
Pursuant to the above Order, the Master sent the following Report12 to the Court on
March 1,2002.
This letter is our Report to the Court as required by the Court
in its Order dated January 2, 2002.
* * *

To accomplish this objective I met with Brad Slack at
Washington Mutual to review the data base that he had prepared of

12

This entire Report of March 1, 2002 is included herein as Ex. G.
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the loan origination cards. This data base was prepared by Mr. Slack
and other Washington Mutual Bank employees under his direction,
as outlined in his August 7, 2000 affidavit filed with the Court. This
process resulted in a data base of 14,482 loan cards. (R. 10370.)
(Emphasis added.)
As described in the Master's March 1, 2002 Report (above), the Master did not do
the work to create the database of 14,482 loan cards. Rather, the work was done
exclusively by employees of Prudential (Brad Slack). The August 7, 2000 Affidavit of
Brad Slack (discussed above) explained how he (Brad Slack) created the database of
14,482 cards.
I physically sorted through over 70,000 loan origination cards and
identified over 10,000 loan cards reflecting loans that may be within
the class defined in this action. This process took over 600 hours
(R. 8493.)
Finally, it is crucial to note the Master's Final Report of March 1, 2002 (R. 10370,
Ex. G) states:
I [Ed Erickson, the Master] have not yet performed testing to
determine if all [70,000] loan cards have been properly segregated
between class members and non-members of the class. (Emphasis
added.)
In summary, the Master has never seen the 70,000 loan cards and has never done
testing to determine how many class members were in that pool of 70,000 loan cards.
The only person who has ever seen the 70,000 loan cards is Brad Slack, an employee of
Prudential. A Final Judgment should not be based upon the work of Prudential
employees which has never been seen or tested by the Master.
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D. THE MASTER'S CLAIM THAT HE HAD DONE A "LIMITED AMOUNT
OF TESTING" WAS INCORRECT
As described in % C above, the Master has never seen or tested the original pool of
70,000 loan cards. Rather, it was a Prudential employee (Brad Slack) who sorted the
70,000 loan origination cards to end up with a "data base" of 14,482 class members.
However, the Master did claim that he had done "a limited amount of testing" of
the "data base" of 14,482. Thus, the Master's Final Report of March 1, 2002 (R. 10370,
Ex. G) states:
It should be noted that I have only performed a limited amount of
testing of this data base [14,482 loan cards], primarily in obtaining a
sample of 50 loan cards to respond to plaintiff counsel's request of
December 27, 2000. (Emphasis added.)
In order to evaluate this claim (viz. "I have . . . performed a limited amount of
testing.") Madsen employed Andrew Carr Conway, Sr. Mr. Conway is a Certified Public
Accountant, a Certified Fraud Examiner, and a Certified Financial Investigator. Mr.
Conway's experience includes thirty years with the Internal Revenue Service and the
Securities Exchange Commission. Mr. Conway gave a total of four affidavits on various
issues in the case. (R. 11862-84, 12156-62; 12468-72; and 12605-13.) However, the
Conway affidavit of September 25, 2003 analyzes the Master's claim that:
I have only performed a limited amount of testing of this data base,
primarily in obtaining a sample of 50 loan cards to respond to
plaintiff counsel's request of December 27, 2000. (R. 10370.) (See
above.)
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Mr. Conway has given the following testimony13 in response to the claim of "a
limited amount of testing."
That process of picking up and delivering cards is best described as
an "errand boy." There is absolutely no basis in the accounting
profession to label that process as "testing" sufficient to produce
sufficient relevant data. First of all, a sample of 50 cards from a
universe of 70,000 cards is much too small a sample to do any
legitimate testing. But if the Master wanted to attempt some type of
testing, he would have applied examination procedures, including the
application of certain mathematical formulas, either to produce his
own statistical calculation or to test Prudential's calculations, to
those 50 cards. The report dated March 1, 2002 does not include any
evidence that the Master performed any examination procedures
including the application of mathematical computations to the 50
card sample. Indeed there is no evidence, based on the Report, that
the Master even read the cards.
* * *

In summary, it was deceitful for the Master to pretend that he
had done a "limited amount of testing" when there was in reality no
statistical "testing" of any kind, based on his Report dated March 1,
2002 and the related historical record in the case. (Emphasis from
original.)
E. THE MASTER HAS ADMITTED THAT HIS MARCH L 2002 REPORT
WHICH FORMS THE BASIS FOR THE FINAL JUDGMENT IS NOT
YET FINISHED
As noted in ^f A, above, the Final Judgment in this case is based entirely on the
Master's Report of March 1, 2002. (See Ex. G herein.) However, the Master, himself,
has acknowledged that his March 1, 2002 report is not yet finished.
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Prudential filed a Motion to Strike the Conway Affidavit. In response, Judge
Dever ruled that "Mr. Conway's statements on accounting procedures [are] allowed, the
remaining portions in the Affidavits and Supplemental Affidavit are stricken. (R. 12771.)
Prudential did not file a counter-affidavit.
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On September 12, 2003, the Master wrote a letter to Judge Dever (R. 12760-62,
included as Ex. H herein). As part of that letter, the Master stated:
I was careful to point out, both on page 1 and page 3 of my Report,
that the loan data base had not been extensively tested.
* * *

As I stated in my letter to Mr. DeBry of April 23, 2003 . . . uof
course, as this matter progresses to the point where damages are
distributed to class members, we will perform additional testing
to confirm proper identification of class members and
completeness of the data base."
* * *

I have consistently stated . . . that only a limited amount of
testing had been done and more testing would be required!
(Emphasis added.)
Obviously, a Final Judgment should not be based upon a Master's Report which
states that more testing would be required. Or stated in other words, the Final
Judgment should only be entered after all of the testing is done.
F. THE MASTER'S FINAL REPORT IS DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT DID NOT
INCLUDE "EVIDENCE" OR "EXHIBITS"
As described in ^f C and D above, a major defect in the Master's Final Report is
that the Master has never seen the 70,000 loan origination cards which form the
foundation of this entire case. But, all of that confusion and delay could have been
avoided if the 70,000 loan cards had been filed with the Court as required by Rule
53(e)(1), U.R.CJP. which states:
The master shall prepare a report upon the matters submitted to him
by the order of reference . . . He shall file the report with the clerk of
the court and in an action to be tried without a jury, unless otherwise
directed by the order of reference, shall file with it a transcript of the
proceeding and of the evidence and the original exhibits. (Emphasis
added.)
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However, in violation of Rule 53(e)(1) (above) the Master's Final Report of March
1, 2002 (Exhibit G) did not include any "evidence" or any "exhibits." Rather, the Final
Report of March 1, 2002 simply contains three pages of conclusions. (R. 10370-2.)
Because of the failure to file "exhibits" or "evidence," plaintiffs filed a Motion that
the Master Complete the Report of March L 2002 (R. 10572.) The above motion
requested copies of specific documents which the Master had used in performing his
calculations as per the March 1, 2002 report.
In response to plaintiffs motion (above) Judge Dever ruled on January 23, 2004
that:
The Master's report is complete. The Order signed by the Court
directed the Master to provide a "Final statistical calculation of the
aggregate class damages." (Order January 2, 2002.) The Master has
done this. (R. 10371.)
The Rule does not require that the Master file with the Court
each and every documents used in the statistical plan submitted to
the Court. It is the statistical plan that is the critical item and that has
been accepted by the court. [Madsens'] Motion is denied.
(R. 12766.)
According to Judge Dever's ruling (above): "It is the statistical plan that is the
critical item." But statistical plans are based upon raw data. And, that data exists on
pieces of paper (or microfilm or microchips). According to Judge Dever's ruling, 50,000
Utah citizens will be bound by the Master's "statistical plan"; but no one should be
allowed to see the pieces of paper that contain the raw data which formed the basis for the
"statistical plan."
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However, Rule 53(e)(1) (above) does not give the trial court any discretion. Rule
53(e)(1) is clear and mandatory ("shall file . . . evidence . . . and exhibits"). (Emphasis
added.)
The reasoning behind the rule (filing of exhibits) is explained in the federal case of
Shafer v. Army & Air Force Exchange Service, 277 F.3d 788, 790 (5th Cir. 2002):
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that in non-jury
actions such as this one, "the court shall accept the master's findings
of fact unless clearly erroneous." Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(e)(2). We
interpret this rule as imposing an independent obligation on the
district court to review the Special Master's factual findings for clear
error. . . . This duty includes examining all relevant evidence,
including in some cases the hearing transcripts in their entirety.
(Emphasis added.)
Obviously, in the case at bar, the trial court was not able to "examine all relevant
evidence" because no evidence and no documents were filed with the Master's March 1,
2002 Report.
G. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING
The standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion (perhaps as a
matter of law) in refusing to disqualify the Master and in adopting the Master's report.
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 742-3 (Utah 1990). If there was abuse of discretion, this
Court "must vacate the order unless the error was harmless." Id. at 741. "The standard
for determining harmless error is whether it is reasonably likely that the trial court's final
order would have been different absent the master's improper activities." Id. at 744.
There appears to be no evidence contradicting the basic facts set forth above,
including the ex parte contacts. These primary facts are admitted by the Master.
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Likewise, there is no evidence contradicting Mr. Conway's more conclusory facts. As
reviewed on page 18 above, Prudential merely argued that Mr. Conway's affidavit
contained legal conclusions or irrelevant facts.
Although there appears to be no contrary factual evidence, the Master did give
reasons for his ex parte contacts and for his failure to do statistically significant testing.
As to ex parte contacts, the Master wrote the following in his letter to Judge
Burton dated September 26, 2001 (R. 9700-03):
At a meeting with counsel of both plaintiff and defendant
present, it was proposed and agreed that the Master would test the
sample of 400 borrowers previously conducted by Prudential
personnel. . . My recollection is that we discussed the fact this
would require us to meet with Prudential's representatives . . .
(R. 9700.)
Throughout my CPA career, anytime I have tested work performed
by others it has always been my practice to discuss with those who
performed the work any exceptions I believe I have found. I have
found this to be absolutely necessary since, on occasion, I or my staff
may believe we have identified an error or exception, but after
obtaining additional information based on discussions with the
parties involved it becomes clear that no exception or error had
occurred. Since this has been my practice, I assume that Mr.
Loebbecke's notes referring to me discussing a draft of my findings
with him first would relate to this process of reviewing and
confirming any potential exceptions noted in Prudential's work.
(R. 9701.)
Prudential would argue that this shows that the ex parte contact was not wrong, but only
standard procedure
Regarding the Master's failure to do statistically significant testing, the Master
wrote the following in his letter to Judge Burton dated March 20, 2002 (R. 10484-6):
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I will reiterate that my firm did test the sample work performed by
Washington Mutual, as described in my December 31, 1996 report to
the Court. We tested 20 of the 400 sample records and found two
minor exceptions, as noted in our December 31, 1996 report. . . .
This had a small impact on the interest portion of the calculation but
no affect on the damage portion. The other error noted in our testing
resulted in a $6.44 difference . . . (R. 10484.)
[S]amples cannot, by definition, produce an exact answer. An exact
answer can only be obtained when sampling is set aside and all
records are categorized. . . . The actual number is 98.95 % of the
sample estimate. If nothing else, this provides additional evidence
validating the sampling process. (R. 10485.)
As indicated above, we did test the 1993 sample performed by
Washington Mutual and arrived at our own independent
computations. (R. 10486.)
Prudential would argue that this shows that the Master was only supposed to do
sampling. There was no requirement that there be enough samples for the testing to be
statistically significant.14

14

However, Prudential has never come forward with any factual evidence to show
what size sample is needed to produce statistically significant results. For example,
Prudential supposedly tested 400 records from a universe of 17,000 records. (R. 5385)
The Master was not present and did not participate in the testing of the 400 records.
Prudential has never offered evidence that testing of 400 from a universe of 17,000 is
statistically significant. But worse still, the Master did not start again to do his own
independent test of 400 different records. Rather, the Master tested 20 out of the
Prudential's sample of 400 --Nwhich in reality means the Master independently tested 20
files from a universe of 17,000 files. Prudential has never offered evidence to show that a
sample of 20 from a universe of 17,000 can be statistically significant.
(f

lofjf.)
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POINT IX
THIS CASE CAN COME TO A SPEEDY CONCLUSION
A. THIS CASE WILL NEED TO BE REMANDED
For all of the following reasons, this case should be remanded for further
proceedings in the trial court:
A.

Damages should be computed for the years prior to 1971.
(See Point II above.)

B.

Damages should be computed for the years after 1979.
(See Point IV above.)

C.

The Master's work was not completed. (See Point VIII, ^ D above.)

D.

The Master should be replaced. (See Point VIII, ^f B above.)

The trouble with all of the above is that this case is now thirty-two years old.
Because of this specific problem, on October 28, 1996, Madsen filed a Motion that
Master Perform an Auxiliary Computation of Damages . . . (R. 5035-7) (included herein
as Ex. E.) The computation was to be at Madsen's expense. Of course, the purpose of
the motion was so that if an appellate court allowed damages before 1971 (see Point II) or
after 1979 (see Point IV) the appellate court could set damages without the time and
expense of a new trial. That motion was not granted. (R. 5525.)
Another trial, and perhaps another appeal, to resolve the above issues could take
five to ten years. Such delay violates Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Utah
which states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due
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course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; . . .
B. THIS COURT SHOULD SPECIFY A SIMPLE METHOD TO CALCULATE
DAMAGES
But there is a shortcut. If the court adopts the reasoning of Derenco v Benjamin
Franklin Federal Savings and Loan Assn , 281 Or. 533, 557 P.2d 427 (1978), the case
could be resolved in the trial court in a matter of months. And, there would likely be no
further appeal.15
Derenco was a virtually identical case in Oregon. Derenco borrowed money from
Benjamin Franklin to purchase a home. Benjamin Franklin required a monthly payment
for annual taxes and insurance on the dwelling. As in the case at bar, Benjamin Franklin
held the tax and insurance funds up to one year before payment was made on the taxes
and insurance. Derenco claimed that Benjamin Franklin was earning a profit by using the
tax and insurance funds (for up to one year) before the taxes and insurance bills were
actually paid. Derenco filed a class action seeking an accounting and return of the profits.
The Derenco court began its analysis by explaining the difficulty of computing
actual profits on the funds:
The trial judge looked at this complicated computation
problem and resolved it with rough justice. He awarded income
from the accounts to plaintiffs equal to the interest that was paid by

Derenco was an interlocutory appeal. The Derenco court gave a specific
formula on how the accounting should be computated. After the interlocutory appeal, the
trial court was able to compute individual damages. But the damage formula in Derenco
was so easy and so clean, that damages were processed in the trial court and there was no
further appeal of the Final Judgment. (A later petition for certiorari was denied.)
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defendant on ordinary pass book savings accounts. This is eminently
sensible. The defendant is a mutual association. The total cost of all
operations, including the maintenance of the reserve accounts as well
as their investment, has necessarily been deducted from income
before payment of pass book interest. The deposits in question were
completely commingled with defendant's other invested funds. The
cost of servicing the accounts and investing the funds were not
capable of being isolated as separate components of defendant's total
expenses.
* * *

Ordering an accounting on earnings from the deposits at pass book
rates is a method of determining the extent of the profits as closely as
possible. We conclude it is the appropriate measure of recovery in
this case. Id., 577 P.2d at 494-5. (Emphasis added.)
Listed below is Judge Rigtrup's computation of damages from 1971 to 1979. (See
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law included herein as Ex. D, R. 3006.) Note that,
each year, the "Average Escrow Balance," and the "Average Expense Rate on Escrow
Funds" is different from the preceding or following years. Note also that the "Net
Earnings" are different for each of the years from 1971 to 1979.
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D MADSEN AVERAGE ESCROW BALANCE
AND LOST INCOME AT NET U.S T-BILL YIELDS
March 3, 1971 to June 30, 1979

Year

Average
Average Average Expense
Escrow T-Bill
Rate on
Balance Yield Escrow Funds

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

$226.70
$284.94
$157.83
$219.72
$335.73
$225.06
$318.28
$402.81
$259.84

4.33%
4.07%
7.03%
7.84%
5.80%
4.98%
5.27%
7.19%
10.07%

1.16%
1.10%
1.02%
1.00%
1.21%
1.78%
1.32%
1.25%
1.18%
TOTALS:

Net Yield

Net
Earnings
On Escrow
Funds

Cumulative
Net
Earnings
Compounded

3.17%
2.97%
6.01%
6.76%
4.59%
3.20%
3.95%
5.94%
8.89%

$ 5.97
$ 8.46
$ 9.49
$14.85
$15.41
$ 7.20
$12.57
$23.93
$11.55

$ 5.97
$ 15.04
$ 25.72
$ 42.56
$ 60.99
$ 72.06
$ 89.34
$119.34
$134.70

$109.43

$134.70

However, in Point II of this brief, Madsen argues that damages should also be paid
for the years 1964 to 1971. But in order to follow Judge Rigtrup's system, that would
require the trial court judge (on remand) to hear evidence on the "Average Expense Rate"
for each of the following years: 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970.
Likewise, the trial court would be required to hear evidence on "Average T-Bill yields"
for each of the following years: 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970. Also the
trial court would hear similar evidence for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984
1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 . . . In other words, the trial court would be required to
hold a "mini trial" on separate earnings each year for the duration of the trust deed
contract. Of course, that process could take many months of trial time. But, all of that
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can be changed if this Court follows Derenco. According to Derenco, the trial court
could simply award the "ordinary passbook savings" rate for each year of the damage
period.
Indeed, the process is so simple and straight forward that a Master may not even be
needed. If damages are computed by simply awarding the "ordinary passbook savings"
rate, such computations might be done by clerical personnel, without the need of a fancy
"Master." Indeed, most of the "Derenco type" of computations might be done by
ordinary discovery procedures. Even if a Master is needed, it would obviously be much
much easier to allow the (new) Master to simply compute the "passbook savings rate" on
pledged funds.
C. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING
This issue is one for the appellate court only, and hence is a question of law.
Simper v Scorup, 78 Utah 71, 1 P.2d 941, 945 (1931). A trial in Simper was held three
times. The Simper Court determined that the "litigation ought to end." So it gave
specific instructions regarding damage calculations, ensuring it would end on remand.
Since this issue does not involve a challenge to a factual or discretionary ruling by
the trial court, there is no need to marshal evidence.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Madsen contends that Prudential has failed for over 25 years to
provide the accounting which was mandated in Madsen L Because Prudential has not
come forward with its accounting, the trial court turned the accounting over to a Master.
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However, Madsen contends that the Master has committed several errors, and that the
work (or reports) of the Master must therefore be vacated.
In summary, the core of this case is an accounting. However, at this stage (after
three appeals and thirty years) neither Prudential nor the Master have provided a
satisfactory accounting. Therefore, Madsen contends that this Court should remand the
case with instructions to conduct the accounting using the "Derenco formula."
However, if this Court remands the case, this Court should also instruct the trial
court that:
A.

The work of the Master must be vacated; and if a Master is needed, a new
Master should be appointed.

B.

There is no statute of limitations.

C.

Damages are not cut off in 1979 (because of § 7-17-4 Utah Code Ann.).

D.

Profits earned by Prudential on Madsen's trust fund should be compounded
each year until such profits and interest are paid to Madsen.

E.

This Court should award pre-judgment interest.

F.

The trial court erred by removing duplexes, second homes, and commercial
properties from the class.
SPECIAL NOTE

The following objection is provisional only. If the court decides that Madsen has
correctly marshaled the evidence in this brief, the objection is withdrawn and there is no
reason for the Court to rule on this objection. However, the Court should rule on this
objection if this Court strikes or disregards some portions of this brief on the grounds ths
the marshaling requirement has not been properly satisfied.
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PROVISIONAL OBJECTION TO MARSHALING REQUIREMENT
Appellant has attempted throughout this brief to satisfy the requirements of Rule
24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to marshal the opponent's factual
evidence. However, appellant respectfully submits such marshaling subject to the
objection that the concept of marshaling violates Article 1, Section 11 of the Constitution
of Utah which states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay;.. .
Simply stated, it can be a complicated and time consuming process for an attorney
to uncover or research facts which might support the opponent (so-called "devil's
advocate"). The expense for such extra research falls upon the client. Thus, a client must
pay his own attorney to gather facts supporting the client; but the client must also pay his
attorney extra money to gather facts that might oppose the client. (Even in contingent fee
cases, the attorney may request a higher percentage if the attorney must take time to
gather facts supporting the opponent's case, or the attorney in a contingent fee case might
have less time to work on his own client's case after marshaling the opponent's
evidence.)
It is respectfully submitted that Anglo-Saxon law is an adversarial process. That
means that Client A hires an attorney to tell Client A's side of the story. Then, Client B
hires an attorney to tell Client B's side of the story. And the Court decides. It has never
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been part of Anglo-Saxon law that a client must pay his attorney to tell both sides of the
story.
DATED this 7 * 7 ^ day of

tftx^ck

> 2007.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant

Robert J. DeBry
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(And supporting Memorandum and subsequent Madsen letter to Master.)
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able limits, as determined by the sound
discretion of the trial court. Under the
circumstances shown, and particularly in
view of the answers given, we do not see
that the cross-examination which was allowed so transgressed propriety as to constitute error prejudicial to the defendant.
[3] In connection with the foregoing,
the following should be observed: Prior to
the colloquy above quoted from the record,
but after the defendant had taken the
stand and given his version of what had
happened upon direct examination, his
counsel moved the court to suppress any
questions about his prior felony convictions
on the ground that the records did not
reflect that he voluntarily and understandingly entered his pleas of guilty in
those cases. It was shown and defendant
acknowledged that he was represented by
counsel in those cases. Our view is in accord with that taken by the trial eourt:
that in the absence of any indication to the
contrary, we presume that the judgments
of our courts are valid.8 This, in addition to
the fact that the defendant himself made
the choice to raise the issue before the jury,
who on the basis of that and the whole
evidence, did not believe that there was any
reasonable doubt of his guilt, leads us to the
"conclusion that there was no error and that
he was accorded his entitlement of a fair
trial. 10
[4,5] On the issue raised as to the failure to submit to the jury the lesser and
included offense of simple assault, the following is pertinent:
Defendants attorney stated to the court:
Your Honor, it has been my advice to
my client to move the Court to put in an
instruction concerning the lesser, included
offense of simple assault, and my* client
does not wish to do that It would "be my
9. State v. Valdez, 19 Utah 2d 426r 432 I^.2d 53;
State v. Seymour, 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P.2d
655. We so state in awareness of defendant's
arguments, citing Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473,
92 S.Ct 1014, 31 L.Ed.2d 374, and Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U,S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23
L.EdJ2d 274.

recommendation to put one in, but he
does not want to. [Emphasis added.]
It is undoubtedly within the prerogative of
the trial court to submit included offenses
if he thinks that the interest of justice so
require.11 But when the defendant indicates that he does not want that done, the
trial court is under no duty to disregard his
request. If the defendant chooses as a matter of trial strategy to have his case submitted on the "all or nothing" gambit, when
he loses, he should not be permitted to do
an about face and claim that the trial court
committed error in going along with his
request, but should have submitted the included offense anyway.12
Affirmed. No costs awarded.
HENRIOD, C. J., and ELLETT, MAUGHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur.

Richard MADSEN and Nancy A. Madsen,
his wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
P R U D E N T I A L F E D E R A L SAVINGS &

LOAN ASSOCIATION, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 14530.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 14, 1977.
Trustors brought action against trustee
and beneficiary under deed of trust to trustors' home executed for purpose of securing
promissory note, seeking restitution of profits allegedly earned on money paid to defendant pursuant to deed provision that
10. State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292, 422 P.2d
196.
11. State v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P.2d 618;
State v. Valdez, footnote 8 above, State v.
Close, 28 Utah 2d 144, 499 P.2d 287.
12. Ibid; and see State v. Gellatly, 22 Utah 2d
149, 449 P.2d 993.
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required plaintiffs to make monthly payments to defendant which could apply payments to insurance premiums and taxes or
to sums due under deed or note. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant H.
Croft, J., entered summary judgment for
defendant, and plaintiffs appealed. The
Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that fact
issue whether payments were pledged property existed, thus precluding summary
judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
Crockett, J., filed dissenting opinion in
which Henriod, C. J., concurred.
Judgment <s=>181(15)
In action brought by trustors against
trustee and beneficiary under deed of trust
to trustor's home executed for purpose of
securing promissory note, seeking restitution of profits allegedly earned on money
paid to defendant pursuant to deed provision, which required plaintiffs to make
monthly payments to defendant which
could apply payments to insurance premiums and taxes or to sums due under deed or
note, which contained all essential elements
of a pledge, and which granted security
interest to defendant, fact issue whether
such payments were pledged property existed, thus precluding summary judgment.
U.C.A.1953, 70A-9-207(2); U.C.C. § 9-207.
Robert J. DeBry, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs-appellants.
Joseph J. Palmer, Salt Lake City, for
defendant-respondent.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
On appeal is a summary judgment granted to defendant, hereafter Prudential,
against plaintiffs, hereafter Madsen or
trustors. The action is founded upon terms
of a deed of trust; and was brought to
determine the status of the parties, and the
legal consequences pursuant to such terms.
We reverse the summary judgment, and
remand for further proceedings. Costs are
awarded to Madsen. Statutory references
are to U.C.A.1953.

Madsens are trustors, and defendant is
both the trustee and beneficiary under a
deed of trust executed September 21, 1964,
for the purpose of securing a promissory
note in the sum of $16,800. The security
conveyed was the home in which plaintiffs
reside.
To protect the security, the trustors further agreed:
2. To keep the buildings and improvements on the above described premises
insured against loss by fire, and such
other casualties and in such forms of insurance, and in such amounts, and in such
companies as may be required by and as
may be satisfactory to the beneficiary,
for the benefit of the beneficiary, and to
pay the premiums therefor promptly
when due, and the policies of insurance
shall be held by the beneficiary, it being
understood, however, that the beneficiary
shall in no event be responsible for the
sufficiency or form or substance of any
policy of insurance, or for the solvency or
sufficiency of any insurance company in
respect to the insurance herein provided.
4. To pay before delinquent all taxes
and assessments affecting said property
(including assessments on appurtenant
water stock and costs, interest and penalties thereon); and all encumbrances,
charges and liens, with interest and penalties on said property or any part thereof, which appear to be or are prior or
superior hereto.
In addition to the monthly payments as
provided in said note, the trustor agrees
to pay to the beneficiary, upon the same
day each month, budget payments estimated to equal one-twelfth of the annual
taxes and insurance premiums; said
budget payments to be adjusted from
time to time as required, and said budget
payments are hereby pledged to the beneficiary as additional security for the full
performance of this deed of trust and the
note secured hereby. The budget payments so accumulated may be withdrawn
by the beneficiary for the payment of
taxes or insurance premiums due on the
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premises. The beneficiary may at any
time, without notice, apply said budget
payments to the payment of any sums
due under the terms of the deed of trust
and the note secured hereby or either of
them. Trustor's failure to pay said budget payments shall constitute a default
under this trust [Emphasis supplied.]

A deposit of money as security for the
performance of a contract has been recognized as a valid pledge.2
it [is] of no consequence that
the amount of filnds subjected to the lien,
and thus, the amount of the lien, may
vary during the existence of the pledge.
The amount is ascertainable at any given
time, and thus the lien is perfected as to
amount.3

Madsen *s appeal is predicated on the theory that the monthly budget payments under provision 4 of the instrument constitute
a common law pledge. They alleged defendant had invested this pledged property,
and earned a substantial profit.
An
accounting is sought on the ground the
substantial profits from the investment of
the pledged funds constitute an unjust enrichment, entitling them to restitution.
The trial court ruled the funds accumulated, from the monthly budget payments,
were not pledged property. Therefore, the
law of pledge was not applicable.
In Campbell v. Peter1 this court stated:
A pledge is really one of the simplest
forms of security. It is the passing of
possession of a chattel by the owner
thereof to the pledgee who is thereby
entitled to hold it until the debt is paid or
the obligation performed. [Citations]
We further cited with approval the definition in the Restatement Security, Sec. 1,
p. 5, which provides:
A pledge is a security interest in a
chattel or an intangible represented by an
indispensable instrument, the interest being created by a bailment for the purpose
of securing the payment of a debt or the
performance of some other duty.
Comment d. of Sec. 1, p. 10 states:
The term "chattel" means any physical
object which is capable of manual delivery and which is not the subject-matter
of real property. It includes instruments
and documents.

In the current matter, plaintiffs, as the
trustors, agreed to protect the security of
Prudential by paying the insurance and
taxes, Madsen agreed to pay the budget
payments, and to pledge them to the beneficiary "as additional security for the full
performance" of the deed of trust and the
note secured thereby.
The essential elements of a pledge are
contained in the agreement, viz., the existence of a debt or obligation, a transfer of
property to the pledgee, to be held as security and, if necessary, to be used to assure
performance of the obligation. Furthermore, the payments accumulated, may, in
the discretion of the beneficiary, be withdrawn for the payment of taxes, insurance
premiums due, or any sum due under the
deed of trust, or note. There is no contract
right granted to Madsen to compel defendant to pay the insurance premiums or taxes.
The payments accumulated may be retained
as security or applied for the purposes stated. The primary obligation to pay the insurance, taxes, and any sum due under the
deed of trust or note is Madsen's. The
provisions of section 4 grant a security interest to Prudential, for the purpose of securing performance of trustors' obligations.
Madsen cites Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch
Company* to establish the legal consequences, under a1 common law pledge,
wherein profits accrue to pledgee; as a
result of the possession of a pledged chattel.
We there said it is the duty of a pledgee to
collect the accruals, from the security, and

1. 108 Utah 565, 568, 162 P.2d 754, 755 (1945)
2. Anderson v Pacific Bank, 112 Cal 598, 44 P.
1063 (1896), United States v Hams, USDC
WD La 1966, 249 FSupp 221, 224, 68 Am

Jur.2d, Secured Transactions, Sec. 58, pp. 886887.
3

-

United

st

*tes

v. Hams, note 2 supra.

4. 94 Utah 134, 143, 76 P.2d 234 (1938)
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Madsen v. Prudential Federal Sav. & Loan
Ass'nC. A.Utah, 1980.
United States Court of Appeals,Tenth Circuit.
Richard MADSEN and Nancy Madsen, his wife, for
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION, for itself and all others similarly
situated, Defendant-Appellee,
Utah Bankers Association, Intervenor-Appellee.
Richard MADSEN and Nancy Madsen, for
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Petitioners,
v.
Honorable Aldon J. ANDERSON, Judge of the
United States District Court for the District of Utah,
Central Division, Respondent.
Nos. 79-1362, 79-1535.
Argued May 6, 1980.
Decided Dec. 3, 1980.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 23, 1981.
Savings and loan association brought suit for
declaratory relief, asserting that it was not required
to pay interest or account to borrowers on escrowed
funds. The United States District Court for the
District of Utah, Central Division, Aldon J.
Anderson, J., consolidated suit with class action for
an accounting and recovery of profits earned by
lender on escrowed amounts which action had been
brought by borrowers in state court and removed by
lender, and granted summary judgment in favor of
lender. Borrowers appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Seymour, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) since no
federal controversy was disclosed on face of
borrowers' state court complaint, as amended,
removal was improper, and (2) federal court had no
subject-matter
jurisdiction
over
declaratory
judgment action.
Reversed with directions.

West Headnotes
[1] Federal Courts 170B €=>242.1
170B Federal Courts
170BIII Federal Question Jurisdiction
170BIII(D) Pleading
170Bk242 Sufficiency of Allegations
170Bk242.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 170Bk242)
Defense predicated upon federal law is not enough
by itself to confer federal jurisdiction, even though
defense is certain to arise. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331,
1337.
[2] Federal Courts 170B €=>243
170B Federal Courts
170BIII Federal Question Jurisdiction
170BIII(D) Pleading
170Bk242 Sufficiency of Allegations
170Bk243 k. Particular Cases. Most
Cited Cases
Because borrowers predicated their suit to recover
interest realized from lender's use of escrow fund
upon rights created under state law, fact that federal
regulations may have created defense to recovery
on such claim was immaterial to finding of federal
question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1337,
1441(b).
[3] Removal of Cases 334 €==>25(1)
334 Removal of Cases
334II Origin, Nature, and Subject of Controversy
334k25 Allegations in Pleadings
334k25(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Even if federal law has preempted state law in area
of federal savings and loan regulation, lender's
claim of federal preemption raised to defeat
common-law contract claim in state court was in the
nature of a defense and could not be basis of federal
question jurisdiction on removal. 28 U.S.C.A. §§
1331, 1337, 1441(b).
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334II Origin, Nature, and Subject of Controversy
334kl9 Cases Arising Under Laws of United
States
334kl9(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Application of federal common law to a plaintiffs
cause of action is sufficient to invoke federal
jurisdiction and thus support removal. 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1441(b).

[8] Removal of Cases 334 €=>19(1)

[5] Federal Courts 170B € ^ 3 7 4
170B Federal Courts
170BVI State Laws as Rules of Decision
170BVI(A) In General
170Bk374 k. Matters of General
Jurisprudence; Federal Common Law. Most Cited
Cases
In deciding whether rules of federal common law
should be fashioned, normally the guiding principle
is that a significant conflict between some federal
policy or interest and use of state law in the
premises must first be specifically shown.

334 Removal of Cases
334II Origin, Nature, and Subject of Controversy
334kl9 Cases Arising Under Laws of United
States
334k 19(1) k. In General Most Cited Cases
Given absence of significant conflict between state
contract law and federal policy expressed in
regulation providing that "except as provided by
contract, a federal association shall have no
obligation to pay interest on escrow accounts apart
from the duties imposed by this paragraph," state
law was applicable in determining whether lender
contracted to pay interest on borrower's escrow
account, and thus claim did not arise under laws of
United States, as would support removal
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1337, 1441(b).
[9] Federal Courts 170B €=>243

[7] Federal Courts 170B €=>412.1

170B Federal Courts
170BI1I Federal Question Jurisdiction
170BIII(D) Pleading
170Bk242 Sufficiency of Allegations
170Bk243 k. Particular Cases. Most
Cited Cases
Federal district court had no jurisdiction over
lender's action for declaratory relief, asserting that it
was not required to pay interest or account to
borrowers for profits realized on escrowed funds,
since controversy underlying action was one of state
law as to whether lender was obligated by its
contract with borrowers to pay interest on escrowed
funds, and lender's claim was defensive in nature.
28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1337, 1441(b).

170B Federal Courts
I70BVI State Laws as Rules of Decision
170BVI(C) Application to Particular Matters
170Bk412 Contracts; Sales
170Bk412.1 k. In General Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 170Bk412)
Interpretation and enforcement of contracts are
traditionally within province of state courts, and
general presumption is in favor of applying state
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Contractual obligations are created by state law.
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Federal Home Loan Bank Board.

them. TRUSTOR'S failure to pay said
budget payments shall constitute a default
under this trust."
App., vol. I, at 5.

Before LOGAN, PECK [FN*] and SEYMOUR,
Circuit Judges.

On March 3, 1975, the Madsens [FN2] filed a class
action [FN3] in Utah state court seeking to recover
interest realized from Prudential's use of the
escrowed funds, based on claims of breach of
contract and unjust enrichment. The state trial court
granted Prudential's motion for summary judgment.
In January 1977, the Utah Supreme Court reversed
the summary judgment and remanded for further
proceedings. It held that the trust deed contained the
essential elements of a pledge, and that under Utah
common law a pledgee must account to the pledgor
for profits resulting from the use of the pledged
property. In October 1977, the Madsens amended
their complaint to ask for an accounting and
recovery of the profits earned by Prudential on the
escrowed amounts. This amended complaint added
a defendant class of lenders with similar escrow

FN* Of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit sitting by designation.
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
The Madsens, plaintiffs-appellants,
borrowed
money from Prudential Federal Savings & Loan
Association (Prudential) to' purchase a home in
1964. Pursuant to this loan, the Madsens signed a
trust deed [FN1] requiring them to make "budget
payments" of one-twelfth of the annual estimated
taxes and insurance along with their monthly
payments of principal and interest. Under the
agreement, these budget payments were pledged as
additional security for repayment of the loan. The
funds were accumulated in a reserve account and
used annually for the payment of taxes and
insurance.

FN1. The trust deed provides in pertinent
part:
"In addition to the monthly payments as
provided in said note, the TRUSTOR
agrees to pay to the BENEFICIARY, upon
the same day each month, budget payments
estimated to equal one-twelfth of the
annual taxes and insurance premiums; said
budget payments to be adjusted from time
to time as required, and said budget
payments are hereby pledged to the
BENEFICIARY as additional security for
the full performance of this deed of trust
and the note secured hereby. The budget
payments
so accumulated may be
withdrawn by the BENEFICIARY for the
payment of taxes or insurance premiums
due on the premises. The BENEFICIARY
may at any time, without notice, apply said
budget payments to the payment of sums
due under the terms of this deed of trust
and the note secured hereby or either of

FN2. The original complaint named
Richard Madsen only as plaintiff. An
amended complaint was filed April 10,
1975, joining his wife Nancy.
FN3. Numerous issues regarding the
classes named in these proceedings have
been raised on appeal. They are not
relevant to our disposition of this case and
are not addressed in our opinion.
Meanwhile in April 1977, Prudential filed a
separate action for declaratory relief in federal
court, asserting thatunder 12 C.F.R. s 545.6-11(c)
[FN4] (hereinafter referred *800 to as section
545.6-11(c)), it is not required to pay interest or
account to the Madsens on the escrowed funds. The
complaint based jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. s 1337
[FN5] and sought a declaration of the rights and
obligations of the parties to the trust deed. When the
Madsens amended their state complaint, Prudential
promptly filed a removal petition, alleging that the
relief requested arises under and is controlled by
federal law. The Utah Bankers Association, a trade

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Oris. U.S. Govt. Works.

n i-xo_

innnm

635 F.2d 797

Page 4

635 F.2d 797
(Cite as: 635 F.2d 797)
association of commercial banks domiciled in Utah,
intervened in the action, and the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board filed an amicus curiae brief. The
federal court denied the Madsens' motion to remand
the case, consolidated the removed action and the
declaratory judgment suit, and granted summary
judgment in favor of Prudential.

FN4. 12 C.F.R. s 545.6-11(c) provides:
"A Federal association which makes a loan
on or after June 16, 1975, on the security
of a single-family dwelling occupied or to
be occupied by the borrower (except such
a loan for which a bona fide commitment
was made before that date) shall pay
interest on any escrow account maintained
in connection with such a loan (1) if there
is in effect a specific statutory provision or
provisions of the State in which such
dwelling is located by or under which the
State-chartered
savings
and
loan
associations, mutual savings banks and
similar institutions are generally required
to pay interest on such escrow accounts,
and (2) at not less than the rate required to
be paid by such State-chartered institutions
but not to exceed the rate being paid by the
Federal association on its regular accounts
(as defined by Section 526.1 of this
chapter). Except as provided by contract, a
Federal
association
shall
have no
obligation to pay interest on escrow
accounts apart from the duties imposed by
this paragraph." (Emphasis added).
FN5. 28 U.S.C. s 1337 provides:
"The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action or
proceeding arising under any Act of
Congress
regulating
commerce
or
protecting trade and commerce against
restraints and monopolies."
On appeal, the Madsens contend, inter alia, that the
federal court lacks jurisdiction over either the
removed case or the declaratory judgment action.
We agree, and reverse with directions to remand the
removed action to state court and to dismiss the

declaratory action.

Removal Jurisdiction
Prudential sought removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s
1441(b), which provides in pertinent part:
"Any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right
arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States shall be removable without regard
to the citizenship or residence of the parties."
Jurisdiction was claimed under 28 U.S.C. s 1331
[FN6] and section 1337 because the cause of action
allegedly arose under the laws of the United States
and Acts of Congress regulating commerce.

FN6. 28 U.S.C. s 1331(a) provides in
pertinent part:
"The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and arises under the Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States."
We note that the same standards apply to
whether the issue "arises under" federal
law in both this section and section 1337.
The Madsens contend their claim in state court is
founded upon contract rights and obligations
created by state law. They assert that Prudential
retains the Madsens' budget payments for up to a
year before using the funds to pay the taxes and
insurance, that Prudential invests the funds in the
interim and receives a profit, and that the Madsens
are entitled to be paid the profits earned on the
pledged funds. The Madsens point out that no
federal law or regulation was invoked, relied on,
attacked, or cited in their complaint. Consequently,
they say, their claim did not arise under federal law.
Prudential and Intervenor argue, on the other hand,
that the trust agreement between Prudential and the
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Madsens contains no express language requiring the
payment of interest on the escrowed funds, and that
the federal regulation does not contemplate interest
payments under such circumstances. They say that
interpretation of the agreement arises under federal
law because Prudential is a regulated federal
savings and loan association and Congress has
preempted the area.
[1] The conditions under which a suit may be said
to "arise under" the laws of the United States were
definitively set out in Gully v. First National Bank,
299 U.S. 109, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936).
There the Court stated that the required federal right
or immunity must be an essential element of the
plaintiffs cause of action, and that the federal
controversy must be "disclosed upon the face of the
complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition
for removal." Id. at 113, 57 S.Ct. at 98. It is beyond
argument that a defense predicated upon *801
federal law is not enough by itself to confer federal
jurisdiction, even though the defense is certain to
arise. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior
Court, 366 U.S. 656, 663, 81 S.Ct. 1303, 1307, 6
L.Ed.2d 584 (1961); Seneca Nursing Home v.
Kansas State Board of Social Welfare, 490 F.2d
1324, 1328 (10th Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 419 U.S.
841, 95 S.Ct. 72, 42 L.Ed.2d 69 (1974); Warner
Bros. Records, Inc. v. R. A. Ridges Distributing
Co., 475 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1973).
In Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson, 586 F.2d
1375, 1381 (10th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 441 U.S.
952, 99 S.Ct. 2182, 60 L.Ed.2d 1058 (1979), we
described the test for determining whether a
complaint asserts, on its face, a substantial federal
question:
"A case 'arises' under the laws of the United States
if it clearly and substantially involves a dispute or
controversy respecting the validity, construction or
effect of such laws which is determinative of the
resulting judgment. Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S.
561, 32 S.Ct. 704, 56 L.Ed. 1205 (1912). Thus, if
the action is not expressly authorized by federal
law, does not require the construction of a federal
statute and/or regulation and is not required by
some distinctive policy of a federal statute to be
determined by application of federal legal
principles, it does not arise under the laws of the
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

United States for federal question jurisdiction.
Lindy v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 1367 (3rd Cir. 1974)."
No argument has been made on appeal that the
Madsens' claim is expressly authorized by federal
law. Consequently, federal removal jurisdiction is
established in this case only if the Madsens' claim
requires the construction of a federal regulation or
the application of federal law.
The federal trial court based its finding of
jurisdiction on North Davis Bank v. First National
Bank, 457 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1972). We find that
case distinguishable. There the central issue in the
complaint was whether the defendant's facility
constituted a branch of a national bank. We noted
that the Supreme Court in First National Bank v.
Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 133, 90 S.Ct. 337, 343,
24 L.Ed.2d 312 (1969), held this determination to
be a "threshold question of federal law." 457 F.2d
at 822. Therefore we held: "(t)his is not a case in
which a federal statute is indirectly or collaterally
involved but it is one having its source in and
arising under (the McFadden Act) 12 U.S.C. s 36(f).
"Id. at 823.
[2] Here the basic issue in the Madsens' complaint
is whether the contract between the Madsens and
Prudential requires the payment of profits or interest
on escrowed funds. Although construction of the
federal regulation cited by Prudential may be
relevant to the defense Prudential asserts, i. e., that
section 545.6-11(c) does not require payment of
interest, the meaning of the regulation is absolutely
irrelevant to the Madsens1 theory of recovery.
Because the Madsens have predicated their suit
upon rights created under state law, the fact that
federal regulations may create a defense to recovery
on such a claim is immaterial to a finding of federal
question jurisdiction. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Texaco, 415 U.S. 125, 94 S.Ct. 1002, 39 L.Ed.2d
209 (1974); Pan American Petroleum, 366 U.S. at
662-64,81 S.Ct. at 1307-1308.
[3] Prudential and Intervenor contend that removal
jurisdiction exists because federal law has
preempted state law in the area of federal savings
and loan regulation. The amicus curiae brief
supports the argument that the field of regulatory
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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control over federal associations has been
preempted. However, even if federal preemption
were established, it would not confer jurisdiction
when it is raised by the defendant to defeat a
common-law contract claim brought in state court.
See Pan American Petroleum, 366 U.S. at 662-65,
81 S.Ct. at 1307-1309; Washington v. American
League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d
654, 660 (9th Cir. 1972), and cases cited therein. In
Home Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Insurance Department, 571 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978)
, the court dismissed the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction despite a federal preemption
argument:
*802 "(T)he Commissioner's proceeding against
Home Federal was based solely upon alleged
violations of Iowa's insurance law and raised no
federal question. Home Federal's allegations of
preemption and failure to engage in the 'business of
insurance,' asserted in its federal petition, actually
are in the nature of defenses to the Commissioner's
charges. Hence they will not suffice for federal
question jurisdiction here. The case is basically
simply an alleged violation of state law. It is not a
federal case and is not converted to one by Home
Federal's defenses to the state's basic allegations."
Id. at 427. Prudential's claim of federal preemption
is in the nature of a defense to the Madsens' cause
of action and cannot be the basis of federal question
jurisdiction on removal.
It is also argued that the Madsens' claim arises
under the laws of the United States because the
contract must be interpreted under federal common
law rather than state law. This is so, Prudential
urges, because the regulation addressing the
payment of interest by federal savings and loan
associations, section 545.6-11(c), states that "
(e)xcept as provided by contract, a Federal
Association shall have no obligation to pay interest
on escrow accounts apart from the duties imposed
by this paragraph." (Emphasis added). Prudential
contends that the circumstances constituting a "
contract" within the meaning of the federal
regulation is a federal question.
[4][5] It is true that the application of federal
common law to a plaintiffs cause of action is
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction and thus
support removal. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91, 100, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 1391, 31 L.Ed.2d 712
(1972). However, federal common law is not
automatically applied to resolve all disputes in a
field subject to pervasive federal regulation. "In
deciding whether rules of federal common law
should be fashioned, normally the guiding principle
is that a significant conflict between some federal
policy or interest and the use of state law in the
premises must first be specifically shown." Wallis
v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68,
86 S.Ct. 1301, 1304, 16 L.Ed.2d 369 (1966). Here,
it is vigorously argued that application of state law
would create a significant conflict because federal
policy requires uniform nationwide standards for
the handling of escrow accounts by federal savings
and loan associations. This argument founders on
the very language of the regulation cited to support
it. Section 545.6-11(c) provides that a federal
savings and loan association shall pay interest on
escrow accounts if a state statute requires such
payments to be made by state-chartered institutions,
or if payments are required by contract. The
regulation expressly anticipates that the obligation
of a federal institution to pay interest on escrow
accounts not only will vary from state to state, but
from contract to contract. See Johnson v. First
Federal Savings & Loan Association, 418 F.Supp.
1106, 1109 (E.D.Mich. 1976). Any argument that
federal policy requires nationwide uniformity with
regard to this issue is untenable. [FN7] See United
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 86 S.Ct. 500, 15
L.Ed.2d 404 (1966).

FN7. We note Intervenor's argument that
this case arises under federal law because
the mortgage form must be approved by
the regulatory agency, see 24 C.F.R. s
203.17, and because the mortgage must
provide for monthly escrow payments for
taxes and insurance, see 24 C.F.R. s
203.23(a). However, these regulations are
silent on the issue of interest payments on
escrow accounts, and therefore do not
conflict with section 545.6-11(c), which
allows interest to be required or prohibited
by
the
individual
contract
terms.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Accordingly, we reject the argument that
the use of these forms mandates a uniform
interpretation under federal law.
[6][7][8] Contractual obligations are created by
state law. See Gully, 299 U.S. at 114-15, 57 S.Ct. at
98-99. See also Pan American Petroleum v.
Superior Court, 366 U.S. at 662-663, 81 S.Ct. at
1307-1308. "The interpretation and enforcement of
contracts is (sic ) traditionally within the province
of state courts," Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511
F.2d 853, 858 (3d Cir. 1975), and the general
presumption is in favor of applying state law. Note:
Federal Common Law, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1512 (1969)
Given *803 the absence of a significant conflict
between the federal policy expressed in section
545.6-11(c) and the use of state law, we hold that
state law is applicable in determining whether
Prudential contracted to pay interest on the
Madsens1 escrow account.
Since no federal controversy was disclosed on the
face of the Madsens' state court complaint, as
amended, removal was improper and the
consolidated case must be remanded to state court.

II.
Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction
[9] The question remains whether the federal court
has subject matter jurisdiction over Prudential's
declaratory judgment action. The federal complaint
alleges that Prudential is a federal savings and loan
association regulated by the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, that it makes residential real estate
loans insured and guaranteed by federal agencies,
and that it is not permitted to pay interest or to
otherwise account for profits realized on escrowed
funds paid by mortgagors "except as provided by
applicable federal regulations." App., vol. II, at
180. It points out that the Madsens have filed a
class action in state court seeking interest on the
escrowed funds under the contractual arrangements
between Prudential and its borrowers, that "(a)
proper resolution of said controversy requires a
declaration of the respective rights and obligations

of the parties to said contractual arrangements," id.
at 181, and that this determination presents a
question under federal laws regulating commerce or
under federal common law.[FN8]

FN8. We have already concluded in part I,
supra, that federal common law is not
applicable to interpret the contract between
Prudential and the Madsens.
As we have noted, the federal regulation that
Prudential cites in its complaint provides that
interest shall be paid on escrow accounts if a statute
in the state where the mortgaged property is located
requires similar lending institutions to pay such
interest. 12 C.F.R. 545.6-11(c), supra n. 4. The
regulation also provides that a federal association
has no other obligation to pay such interest "
(e)xcept as provided by contract." Id. Consequently,
the controversy underlying the federal declaratory
judgment action is the same as in state court:
whether Prudential is obligated by its contract with
the Madsens to pay interest on the escrowed funds.
This court has consistently adopted the rationale set
out by the Supreme Court in Public Service
Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237,
248, 73 S.Ct. 236, 242-243, 97 L.Ed. 291 (1952):
"Where the complaint in an action for declaratory
judgment seeks in essence to assert a defense to an
impending or threatened state court action, it is the
character of the threatened action, and not of the
defense, which will determine whether there is
federal-question jurisdiction in the District Court. If
the cause of action, which the declaratory defendant
threatens to assert, does not itself involve a claim
under federal law, it is doubtful if a federal court
may entertain an action for a declaratory judgment
establishing a defense to that claim. This is dubious
even though the declaratory complaint sets forth a
claim of federal right, if that right is in reality in the
nature of a defense to a threatened cause of action.
Federal courts will not seize litigations from state
courts merely because one, normally a defendant,
goes to federal court to begin his federal-law
defense before the state court begins the case under
state law. (citations omitted)."
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(Emphasis added). In Monks v. Hetherington, 573
R2d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir. 1978), we applied the
traditional view "that a party cannot by artful
pleading anticipate a defense based on federal law
and thus bring within federal jurisdiction an action
that could not otherwise be heard in federal court."
And in Chandler v. O'Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045,
1055-56 (10th Cir. 1971), we noted that this
principle is particularly applicable where, as here,
the state court action *804 has been instituted and
issues have been decided.
We held in part I, supra, that the federal preemption
argument is defensive in nature. This is true whether
the claim is made as the basis of removal or to
support federal jurisdiction in a declaratory
judgment action. See, e. g., Home Federal Savings
& Loan Association v. Insurance Department, 571
F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978). This case is not like
Conference
of Federal
Savings & Loan
Associations v. Stein, 604 F.2d 3256 (9th Cir. 1979)
, affd mem., 445 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 1304, 63
L.Ed.2d 754 (1980), First Federal Savings & Loan
Association v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 (1st Cir.
1979), or others cited by Prudential, Intervenor, and
amicus curiae, where state regulations directly
conflict with federal regulations governing federal
associations. No such conflict exists here.

(1971).
Here as in Gully "(t)he most one can say is that a
question of federal law is lurking in the background.
" 299 U.S. at 117, 57 S.Ct. at 99-100. Accordingly,
we hold the court has no jurisdiction over the
declaratory judgment complaint and the action must
be dismissed.
Reversed.
C.A.Utah, 1980.
Madsen v. Prudential Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n
635 F.2d 797
END OF DOCUMENT

The defensive nature of Prudential's claim is
expressed throughout its complaint. It alleges that a
state action has been brought seeking interest
pursuant to the contractual arrangements between
the parties, and that any order of the state court
requiring Prudential to pay interest or otherwise
account to the Madsens would be contrary to the
federal regulations. If the Madsens had attempted to
bring their action in federal court by anticipating or
responding to Prudential's possible federal defense,
the case would lack federal jurisdiction. See Phillips
Petroleum, 415 U.S. at 128, 94 S.Ct. at 1004;
Skelly Oil Co., 339 U.S. 667, at 672, 70 S.Ct. 876,
879, 94 L.Ed. 1194; Home Federal Savings & Loan
Association, 571 F.2d at 426-27. It is irrelevant for
purposes of jurisdiction that "federal consent is the
source of state authority." Gully, 299 U.S. at 116,
57 S.Ct. at 99; Oklahoma ex rel. Wilson v.
Blankenship, 447 F.2d 687, 691 (10th Cir.), cert,
denied, 405 U.S. 918, 92 S.Ct. 942, 30 L.Ed.2d 787
»2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Oris. U.S. Govt. Works.
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H
Madsen v. Prudential Federal Sav. and Loan
Ass'nUtah,1988.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Richard MADSEN and Nancy Madsen, his wife, for
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 860148.
Dec. 30, 1988.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Philip
R. Fishier, J., entered an order which disqualified
another judge after he had presided over a trial and
had orally announced his ruling but before he had
entered formal findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and final judgment. Opponents of disqualification
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held
that: (1) the motion to disqualify the judge was not
timely; (2) the judge's remarks did not evidence
prejudice so as to justify disqualification; and (3)
the judge did not have a financial interest in the
outcome of the case.
Reversed and remanded.
Zimmerman, J., concurred in the result.
West Headnotes
fl] Judges 227 €=>51(2)

227 Judges
2211V Disqualification to Act
227k51 Objections to Judge, and Proceedings
Thereon
227k51(2) k. Time of Making Objection.
Most Cited Cases
To be timely, motion to disqualify judge should be
filed at counsel's first opportunity after learning of
disqualifying facts; only if good cause for delay is
demonstrated in motion seeking disqualification
should delinquent motion even be considered.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 63(b).
[3] Judges 227 €==>51(2)
227 Judges
227IV Disqualification to Act
227k51 Objections to Judge, and Proceedings
Thereon
227k51(2) k. Time of Making Objection.
Most Cited Cases
Party's motion to disqualify judge was not filed "as
soon as practical after * * * bias or prejudice" was
known; party failed to raise issue during colloquy
with judge before his ruling, party failed to object
after ruling was made when objections were invited
by judge, and party delayed 39 days after trial to
file its disqualification motion. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 63(b).
[4] Judges 227 C=>40

227 Judges
227IV Disqualification to Act
227k51 Objections to Judge, and Proceedings
Thereon
227k51(2) k. Time of Making Objection.
Most Cited Cases
Party who has reasonable basis for moving to
disqualify judge may not delay in hope of fust
obtaining favorable ruling and then complain only if
result is unfavorable. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 63(b).

227 Judges
227IV Disqualification to Act
227k40 k. Constitutional and Statutory
Provisions. Most Cited Cases
While most of the Code of Judicial Conduct is
aimed exclusively at the regulation of judicial
behavior, Canon relating to disqualification not only
regulates judicial conduct, but also seeks to avoid
unfairness by insuring each litigant an impartial
judge. Code of JudConduct, Canon 3, subd. C.
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disqualification. U.C.A.1953,
Jud.Conduct, Canon 3, subd. C.

227 Judges
227IV Disqualification to Act
227k49 Bias and Prejudice
227k49(2) k. Statements and Expressions
of Opinion by Judge. Most Cited Cases
Judge was not required to disqualify himself from
action in which bank was defendant, despite judge's
statement that many years earlier he had "cussed
financial institutions." U.C.A.1953, 78-7-1; Code
of Jud.Conduct, Canon 3, subd. C.
16] Judges 227 C=>49(2)
227 Judges
227IV Disqualification to Act
227k49 Bias and Prejudice
227k49(2) k. Statements and Expressions
of Opinion by Judge. Most Cited Cases
As long as a judge does not allow personal
propensities to obscure the evidence and will decide
the case only after all the evidence is heard,
disqualification is generally not warranted by a
judge's comments. Code of Jud.Conduct, Canon 3,
subd. C.
[7] Judges 227 €==>42
227 Judges
227IV Disqualification to Act
227k41 Pecuniary Interest
227k42 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
For purposes of claim a judge should have
disqualified himself from case involving bank,
judge did not have "financial interest" in case,
despite the fact that judge was former borrower
from that bank because the judge had no ownership
interest as required by the Code of Judicial Conduct.
[8] Judges 227 €=^49(1)
227 Judges
227IV Disqualification to Act
227k49 Bias and Prejudice
227k49(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Judge who heard case involving bank, and who was
former borrower of that bank, did not have "any
other interest" in litigation, so as to require
© 2007 Thomson/West. No
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*539 Robert J. DeBry, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs
and appellants.
Joseph J. Palmer, Reid E. Lewis, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellee.
STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiffs Richard and Nancy Madsen appeal a
district court order entered by Judge Philip Fishier
which disqualified Judge Kenneth Rigtrup after he
had presided over a trial in this case and had orally
announced his ruling but before he had entered
formal findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
final judgment. Judge Fishier ruled that Judge
Rigtrup had no actual bias, but did have an
appearance of bias and voided the trial and all prior
orders entered by Judge Rigtrup in the case.
This appeal is yet another installment in the
protracted history of this case, which started in
1975 and has already been before this Court once,
Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 558
P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977), and before a federal
appellate court once, Madsen v. Prudential Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir.1980),
cert, denied, 451 U.S. 1018, 101 S.Ct. 3007, 69
L.Ed.2d 389 (1981). The facts which gave rise to
this litigation are reported in detail in those
opinions. 558 P.2d at 1338-39; 635 F.2d at
799-800.
Plaintiffs are representatives of a certified class of
borrowers whose trust deeds with Prudential
Federal Savings and Loan Association (hereafter "
Prudential") contained language identical to that
contained in the Madsens' trust deed. In 1984, this
action was assigned to Third District Court Judge
Kenneth Rigtrup who had been assigned to four
other similar cases.FN1 Prudential appeared as
amicus curiae in each of the other actions.

FN1. Roger Hal Read and Elizabeth W.
Read, for themselves and all others
similarly situated v. American Equity
Corporation, for itself and all others
similarly situated, district court No.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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C-244219 (filed August 11, 1977). James
W. Petty and Mary E Petty, for themselves
and all others similarly situated v. Western
Savings and Loan Co., district court No.
C-79-700 (dismissed July 19, 1983).
Russell R Everill and Helen B. Everill, for
themselves and all others similarly situated
v Western Savings and Loan Co., district
court No. C-79-701 (dismissed July 19,
1983). Ernest H. Dixon and Lori Ann P.
Dixon, for themselves and all others
similarly situated v United Savings and
Loan Ass'n, district court No. C-79-1105
(filed February 16, 1979).
The issue here was whether a financial institution
which loaned money to the plaintiffs on a first trust
deed is obligated to pay interest to the plaintiffs on
monthly budget payments for property taxes and
insurance that are paid with the monthly mortgage
payments. In a bench trial in September 1985, the
Madsens and Prudential tried the limited issue of
whether Prudential made any profit on the budget
payments it collected from the Madsens. At the
close of the trial, Judge Rigtrup ruled from the
bench. Just prior to his ruling, the following
exchange occurred between Judge Rigtrup and
counsel for the parties:
THE COURT: ... I'll share the benefits of my
decision with you at this point.
... I'll expose my biases and my prejudices and be
very frank with you.
I think there are some substantial kinds of policy
things that have really caused me great trouble and
trauma. As I've indicated earlier, and no objection
was interposed, I was a customer of Prudential
Federal Savings & Loan Association and paid
without default for 25 years at four and
three-quarters per cent, ... and I computed that out
and I thought, why, those robbers, they are charging
me twice what I'm borrowing from them, and that's
unfair.
As I get older and more sophisticated IMR. PALMER [Attorney for Prudential]: Your
Honor, I hate to interrupt, but I need to make the
point that this is news to me, that you had been a
customer of Prudential.
THE COURT: I indicated that on several occasions.
MR. PALMER: I beg the Court's pardon, but that is
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

news to me. I don't *540 recall that at all-if
anybody else does-recall you telling me that, and ITHE COURT: I indicated that in these earlier
meetings that I had paid my loan off at some point,
and I'd had a loan with Prudential Federal Savings.
MR. PALMER: Perhaps the Court is thinking of
conferences with other counsel. The reason I make
the point isTHE COURT: My earlier conferences were not
with the two of you in this case, they were with Mr.
Billings, with Mr. Ashton, with you, with Mr.
Giauque, Mr. McDonough, with respect to whoever
he represents. It was Mr. Giauque or someone
from that office. They were a corrective kind of a
deal.
MR. PALMER: In any event, I stand to raise the
point now that it is news to us. I believe it-I take it
that the Court did not feel that it had any prejudice
because of that.
THE COURT: No.
MR. PALMER: All right.
THE COURT: I have a recollection that
somewhere along the line I did make that
disclosure. I don't know how you could be part of
the community and be a homeowner and not have
borrowed from someone. And so I think I make it
very clear in one of those collective kinds of
meetings that my loan had been with Prudential
Federal.
At any rate, it's a fact, and it was something that I
never tried to hide or have hid from anyone. So
there's no sense of covering up. I guess if that
creates error, it creates error. But so be it. I have
a recollection that I did expose it, and whether you
were there or Mr. Lewis or anyone else, I don't
know. I did make the disclosure early on.
MR. DeBRY [Attorney for the Madsens]: I do
recall some conversations, I think, off the record, of
that effect, and I honestly don't recall who was
present. But it was a comment that was made from
time to time.
MR. PALMER: Could I inquire of the Court when
the loan was paid off?
THE COURT: Probably two years ago. I'm not
sure at what point in the discussions I indicated that,
but I'm sure that in the presence of the collective
group that I indicated that I had been a borrower of
Prudential Federal Savings.
MR. PALMER: No prejudice arose in the Court's
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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mind because of the fact that we collected a
mortgage escrow from you?
THE COURT: No.
MR. PALMER: Okay. I can't do anything else but
ask.
THE COURT: That's what I've been trying to tell
you. That was the intention.
MR. PALMER: I make the point because I didn't
want to go on and let the Court noteTHE COURT: I think I've made general comments
throughout that I have cussed financial institutions,
and customers do simply because they see inherent
injustice about that. And my perspective today,
after 23 years has passed, has become much, much
different at the end of the 23 years. Far before that
I could see the cost of money was markedly greater,
and that I would be a damn fool to prepay. So I
paid faithfully every month for 25 years, and not a
day sooner or a day later. And I'm just
commenting generally in terms of unjust or
whatever. The tension is between that to be gained
and that to be lost, I suppose, in my eyes. And I
have a feeling that class actions are a form of
champerty and maintenance in that the one that
substantially gains is the lawyer or the expert. Mr.
Madsen stands to gain little, except he has struck a
blow for freedom, I suppose, in the form that the
consumer has achieved balance.
Be seated, Mr. DeBry.
MR. DeBRY: 1 want to make an objection on the
record. I really must.
THE COURT: Well, sit down.
MR. DeBRY: Before you give your decision, I
must make a comment, because I know the Court is
being candid and this has been a long struggle, and
Prudential says they are almost broke before this.
And you say maybe DeBry will make some money,
but I haven't yet. But I really must interpose an
objection at this *541 point. If the Court harbors
this type of personal bias with respect toTHE COURT: I'm justMR. DeBRY: -class actions.
THE COURT: I'm just telling you about the tension.
MR. DeBRY: I must object to the Court's sitting on
this case if you have that kind of bias.
THE COURT: I'm just telling you why I'm getting
to my ruling and how I'm getting to my ruling and
being open and candid with both of you. But that's
a built-in problem with class actions. They have

achieved a beneficial result. The difficulty] I am
locked into is that I have got to follow the law of the
case. I have got the Supreme Court that's telling
me what to do....
MR. DeBRY: Your HonorTHE COURT: You can take exceptions after I get
done. I'm trying toMR. DeBRY: I might note that I do have an
exception to take at this time before you give your
verdict in this matter.
THE COURT: I haven't given a verdict.

Prudential did not object during the course of the
exchange. Judge Rigtrup rendered his decision in
favor of the Madsens and awarded them damages of
$134.70.
After the ruling, Judge Rigtrup asked if either side
wished to take any exceptions. Prudential's
attorney stated only that an appeal was anticipated
before any class issues were addressed. However,
no specific
objection
to Judge
Rigtrup's
qualifications was voiced.
Thirty-nine days after Judge Rigtrup announced his
decision, Prudential raised its first formal objection
to the judge's qualifications to hear the case by
filing a motion for disqualification under Rule 63(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.FN2 The
motion was assigned to the then-presiding judge of
the Third District, the Honorable Philip Fishier.
Judge Fishier held several hearings on the motion
and considered testimony, portions of the trial
transcript, affidavits, and memoranda in reaching
his decision. Judge Fishier ruled that Prudential's
motion was timely, that the possibility existed that
Judge Rigtrup may have a financial interest in the
outcome of the case, and that Judge Rigtrup's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Judge
Fishier expressly found no actual bias on the part of
Judge Rigtrup, but ordered him disqualified solely
on the appearance of bias. After the case was
assigned to another judge for retrial, we granted
plaintiffs' request for an interlocutory appeal of
Judge Fishler's order.
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FN2. Rule 63(b) reads:
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to
any action or proceeding, civil or criminal,
or his attorney shall make and file an
affidavit that the judge before whom such
action or proceeding is to be tried or heard
has a bias or prejudice, either against such
party or his attorney or in favor of any
opposite party to the suit, such judge shall
proceed no further therein, except to call in
another judge to hear and determine the
matter.
Every such affidavit shall state the facts
and the reasons for the belief that such bias
or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as
soon as practicable after the case has been
assigned or such bias or prejudice is
known. If the judge against whom the
affidavit
is directed
questions
the
sufficiency of the affidavit, he shall enter
an order directing that a copy thereof be
forthwith certified to another judge
(naming him) of the same court or of a
court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall
then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the
affidavit. If the judge against whom the
affidavit is directed does not question the
legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the
judge to whom the affidavit is certified
finds that it is legally sufficient, another
judge must be called in to try the case or
determine the matter in question. No
party shall be entitled in any case to file
more than one affidavit; and no such
affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied
by a certificate of counsel of record that
such affidavit and application are made in
good faith.

[1] While a motion to disqualify a judge should not
be undertaken lightly, it must be made promptly. A
party who has a reasonable basis for moving to
disqualify a judge may not delay in the hope of first
obtaining a favorable ruling and then complain only
if the result is unfavorable. Not only is such a
tactic unfair, but it may evidence a belief that the
judge is not in fact biased. Furthermore, delay
imposes unnecessary disruption on both the judicial
system and litigants. A disqualification proceeding
is a collateral attack on the substantive action, it
disrupts orderly litigation, and it necessarily results
in significant additional costs to the parties.
Accordingly, a party must move with dispatch once
a basis for disqualification is discovered. See
Duplan Corp v. Deenng Milhken, Inc., 400
F.Supp. 497, 508-10 (D.S.C.1975); Hunmcutt v
Hunnicutt, 248 Ga. 516, 518, 283 S.E.2d 891, 893
(1981). See generally L. Abramson, Judicial
Disqualification Under Canon 3C of the Code oj
Judicial Conduct 11-12 (1986) [hereinafter L.
Abramson, Judicial Disqualification ].
Timeliness is essential in filing a motion to
disqualify.FN3 In Utah, disqualification motions in
civil proceedings are governed by Rule 63(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (set out in footnote
2). That rule requires that a disqualification motion
"shall be filed as soon as practicable after the case
has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is
known." The issue in this case is whether
Prudential's failure to raise the issue during the
colloquy with the judge before the ruling, its failure
to object after the oral ruling was made when
objections were invited by Judge Rigtrup, and
Prudential's delay of thirty-nine days after the trial
to file its disqualification motion meet the "as soon
as practicable" requirement of Rule 63(b).

I.
The Madsens contend that Prudential waived its
objections to Judge Rigtrup's qualifications by
failing to make a timely objection at the time of the
judge's exchange with counsel, thereby giving
Prudential the advantage of waiting to see if the
ruling was favorable and, if not, of moving to
disqualify. In addition, Prudential*542 waited an
extended period to file its motion to disqualify.

FN3. Some jurisdictions impose specific
time limitations on some disqualification
motions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982)
(affidavit of bias must be filed not less
than ten days before the beginning of the
term at which the proceeding is to be
heard); Alaska Stat. § 22.20.022(c) (1984)
(affidavit for peremptory removal of judge
must be filed within 5 days after the case is
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at issue or within 5 days after the issue is
assigned to a judge); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann.
title 14, § 1103 (1980 & Supp.1988)
(petition for change of judge must be filed
within ten days after service of complaint
or other application for which equitable
relief is sought); Minn.R.Civ.P. 63.03
(notice to remove judge must be filed
within ten days after a party receives
notice of which judge is presiding at the
trial or hearing, but no later than
commencement of the trial or hearing).
Federal cases require that motions to disqualify
must be made as soon as the facts which form the
basis for the disqualification become known. See
United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th
Cir.1986) ("a motion for recusal filed weeks after
the conclusion of a trial is presumptively untimely
absent a showing of good cause for its tardiness");
Singer v. Wadman, 745 F.2d 606, 60S (10th
Cir.1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct.
1396, 84 L.Ed.2d 785 (1985) (motion to disqualify
filed one year after complaint and after adverse
rulings of trial court was untimely); Wood v.
McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 802 (9th Cir.1981), cert,
denied, 455 U.S. 942, 102 S.Ct. 1437 (1982) (delay
of sixteen months after grounds for disqualification
arose made motion to disqualify untimely); United
States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 390 (7th Cir.1976),
cert denied, 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1551, 51
L.Ed.2d 775 (1977) ("The ] a w is well settled that
one must raise the disqualification of the judge at
the earliest moment after knowledge of the facts
demonstrating the basis for such disqualification.");
Satterfield v. Edenton-Chowan Bd. of Educ, 530
F.2d 567, 574 (4th Cir.1975) ("One must raise the
disqualification of the trier, whether he be a judge,
an administrator, or an arbitrator, at the earliest
moment after knowledge of the facts."); Davis v.
Cities Sei-v. Oil Co., 420 F.2d 1278, 1282 (10th
Cir.1970) (motion to disqualify filed a month after
the case was decided against movants is too late);
Duplan Corp. v, Deering Milliken, Inc., 400
F.Supp. 497, 510 (D.S.C.1975) ("a recusal motion
must be made at counsel's first opportunity after
discovery of the disqualifying facts" (emphasis in
original)).

© 2007 Thomson/West. No CI

*543 State courts have also imposed stringent
timeliness requirements. See, eg., Wakefield v.
Stevens, 249 Ga. 254, 255, 290 S.E.2d 58, 60 (1982)
(motion to disqualify untimely if not "filed
promptly and without delay, at the first opportunity
after ... [learning] of the grounds for disqualification
" (quoXmgStale v. Fleming, 245 Ga. 700, 705, 267
S.E.2d 207, 210 (1980) (Hill, J., concurring)));
Carpenter v. State, 223 Kan. 523, 525, 575 P.2d 26,
29 (1978) (affidavit of prejudice should be filed as
soon as a party "becomes aware of the facts giving
rise to the challenge"). The rule is stated in 46
AmJur.2d Judges § 202, at 225-26 (1969):
It is a well-recognized rule that an application for
the disqualification of a trial judge must be filed at
the earliest opportunity. The courts generally apply
this rule with strictness against a party who, having
knowledge of facts constituting a disqualification,
does not seek to disqualify the judge until an
unfavorable ruling has been made.
(Footnotes omitted).
[2] While the Utah rule imposes no specific time
limitation on the filing of a motion for
disqualification, timeliness is still essential. To be
timely, a motion to disqualify should be filed at
counsel's first opportunity after learning of the
disqualifying facts. Only if good cause for a delay
is
demonstrated
in
the
motion
seeking
disqualification should a delinquent motion even be
considered. See Davis, 420 F.2d at 1282; Duplan
Corp., 400 F.Supp. at 509-10.
[3] Prudential's motion to disqualify Judge Rigtrup
was not timely. Prudential claims that its first
notice of bias on Judge Rigtrup's part occurred in
his statement prior to announcing his ruling.
However, Prudential's attorney did not object to the
judge's continued participation in the case, as did
opposing counsel, nor did Prudential ask for a
continuance
to
consider
disqualification.
Prudential's attorney merely responded "that this is
news to me" and then, after further dialogue with
the judge, allowed the proceedings to continue
without objection. By contrast, the Madsens'
counsel did object to Judge Rigtrup's continuation
as trial judge.
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Prudential claims that Judge Rigtrup seemed
determined to quell all interruptions as evidenced
by his repeated admonition to plaintiffs' counsel to "
sit down." Nevertheless, the record set out above
demonstrates that plaintiffs' counsel was able to
object. Beyond that, moments after Judge Rigtrup
had delivered his oral ruling, he specifically
afforded Prudential another opportunity to object: "
Do you desire to make any farther exceptions...."
Prudential's attorney responded: "Well, what I'm
suggesting is that I expect that there will be an
appeal before we get into the class issues, and I
would anticipate findings and a judgment be
presently entered in favor of Mr. Madsen."
However, no mention was made of "recusal" or "
disqualification."
Prudential asserts that it did object at trial, but our
review of the record discloses no objection. On the
contrary,
it discloses Prudential's
apparent
acquiescence in Judge Rigtrup's rendering a
decision.
Finally, Prudential waited thirty-nine days after the
ruling to file a formal motion to disqualify.
Prudential argues that it had good cause for the
delay. It contends that the lengthy delay was
necessary to review personal notes, discuss the
matter with other counsel in related cases, discuss
the matter with Prudential's officers, and order,
receive, and review a partial transcript. However,
the review of the attorney's notes and the
discussions with others should have consumed no
more than a day or two. We doubt that the
transcript was essential; in any event, all the facts
relating to disqualification were known to
Prudential's attorney at the close of the proceedings
and an affidavit of prejudice and motion to
disqualify could have been prepared with only a
knowledge of those facts. We see no reason why
the affidavit of prejudice and motion to disqualify
should have taken more than ten days to prepare
and file, especially since this case was at an
advanced stage. Prudential failed to act with
sufficient promptness in a *544 matter which, by its
very nature, requires promptness.
In sum, Prudential's motion to disqualify was not
filed "as soon as practicable after ... bias or
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim

prejudice is known," as required by Rule 63(b).
Indeed, for all that appears, Prudential was not
convinced at the time of the ruling that Judge
Rigtrup should have recused himself.

II.
Given the importance of impartiality and the duty of
a judge to recuse him- or herself sua sponte when
necessary, we next address the issue of whether
Judge Rigtrup should have disqualified himself on
his own motion. In this context, we analyze the
issues of apparent and actual bias raised by
Prudential and addressed by Judge Fishier in his
ruling.
Standards
for judicial
disqualification
are
established by statute and the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which this Court adopted in 1974 and
which is patterned after the ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct of 1972. Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1 (1987)
provides for disqualification if the judge is a party,
has an interest in a case, is related to either party, or
has been an attorney for either party in the action. FN4
The statute allows a waiver of disqualification
if both parties consent, a point not at issue here.

FN4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1 reads in
full:
Disqualification for interest or relation to
parties.
Except by consent of all parties, no justice,
judge or justice of the peace shall sit or act
as such in any action or proceeding:
(1) to which he is a party, or in which he is
interested.
(2) when he is related to either party by
consanguinity or affinity within the third
degree, computed according to the rules of
the common law.
(3) when he has been attorney or counsel
for either party in the action or proceeding.
But the provisions of this section shall not
apply to the arrangement of the calendar or
the regulation of the order of business, nor
to the power of transferring the action or
proceeding to some other court.
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Canon 3 C of the Code of Judicial Conduct
(hereafter "Code") is more comprehensive than the
statute in prescribing instances when judicial
disqualification is warranted. In this case, the
parties have based their arguments for and against
disqualification on the Code. For this reason, we
address the disqualification issues in the context of
the Code.
[4] The Madsens contend that the Code is an ethical
code only and that a violation of the Code should
not result in the invalidation of all of a judge's
previous rulings. They argue that a violation
should result only in discipline of the judge and not
in a penalty to an innocent party who may have
expended large amounts of time and money only to
have a large part of the lawsuit invalidated because
of a judicial disqualification. While most of the
Code is aimed exclusively at the regulation of
judicial behavior, Canon 3 C not only regulates
judicial conduct, but it also seeks to avoid
unfairness by insuring each litigant an impartial
judge. Because we conclude that disqualification
of the trial judge was not appropriate, we do not
address further the issue of retroactive invalidation
of a trial judge's rulings.
Prudential argues that Judge Fishier was correct in
disqualifying Judge Rigtrup because Judge Rigtrup
had personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts, displayed bias against Prudential, and had a
financial interest in the outcome of the case. These
allegations impute actual bias, but Judge Fishier
specifically found no actual bias.FN5 Moreover, as
shown below, *545 none of Prudential's allegations
of bias withstands scrutiny.
FN5. Obviously, actual bias need not be
found to support disqualification. See
State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094
(Utah 1988). An appearance of bias or
prejudice is sufficient for disqualification,
but even disqualification because of
appearance must have some basis in fact
and be grounded on more than mere
conjecture and speculation. In close
cases, disqualification is the favored
course
of
action.
However,

disqualification is not automatic and the
basis for disqualification should be
thoroughly examined, especially in cases
such as this which are at an advanced stage
of the litigation process. See, e.g., In re
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357,
364 (4th Cir. 1976). As is demonstrated
elsewhere
in
this
opinion,
close
examination of Prudential's allegations
against Judge Rigtrup show them to be
without merit. Therefore, there was no
basis in this case for disqualification.
We note that disqualification due to the
appearance of bias or prejudice seems
more amenable to prospective application.
The purpose of disqualification based on
appearance of bias is "to promote public
confidence in the judicial system by
avoiding even the appearance of partiality."
Health Services Acquisition Corp. v.
Liljeberg, 796 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1986)
, affd, 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100
L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). In Liljeberg v.
Health Sei~vices Acquisition Corp., 486
U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2202-03, 100
L.Ed.2d 855 (1988), the United States
Supreme
Court
concluded
that
disqualifying facts which a federal district
judge should have known but which he had
forgotten were sufficient to disqualify the
judge under the federal statute. However,
the federal statute in question, 28 U.S.C. §
455(a) (1982), requires disqualification for
an appearance of bias.
Canon 3 C(l) makes disqualification based
on an appearance of bias discretionary ("A
judge should disqualify himself ...")
(emphasis added).

First, Prudential argues that Judge Rigtrup had
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
and, thus, violated Canon 3 C(l)(a). The issue
before Judge Rigtrup was whether Prudential
earned a net profit on the Madsens' budget
payments. Prudential claimed a net loss in the
handling of such funds. Prudential asserts that it
had waived insurance premium payments of certain
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borrowers, including Judge Rigtrup, in 1977 and
gave those borrowers the option of continuing their
escrow accounts or discontinuing them altogether in
1979. For that reason, Prudential asserts, the judge
had independent knowledge of the disputed issue
from which Judge Rigtrup "jumped to the
conclusion in his ruling that Prudential could have
and would have discontinued the Madsens' reserve,
or otherwise changed its handling procedures, rather
than lose money in requiring them."
Judge Fishier was not persuaded that Judge Rigtrup
had any knowledge conceniing the facts in dispute
in this case and found that this allegation would not
support a claim of bias. Judge Fishier was correct.
Although Judge Rigtrup had knowledge of his own
dealings with Prudential some six and eight years
before the trial, that knowledge did not bear on the
issue of whether Prudential made a profit on the
budget payment accounts. Prudential cites no
record support to the contrary.

B.
[5] Next, Prudential argues that remarks made by
Judge Rigtrup just before delivering his ruling
evidenced prejudice. Prudential specifically asserts
here, as it did before Judge Fishier, that the remarks
made by the judge, including the comment, "I have
cussed financial institutions, ..." revealed a bias that
warranted
disqualification.
Judge
Fishler's
memorandum decision does not mention this
allegation as a basis for his disqualification order.
Concededly, Judge Rigtrup was somewhat less than
diplomatic in expressing what his thinking had been
many years ago about financial institutions and how
his thinking had evolved over the years.
Nevertheless, Judge Rigtrup's own remarks in
context explain the isolated instances thought by
Prudential to show bias. The judge stated:
I think I've made general comments throughout that
I have cussed financial institutions, and customers
do simply because they see inherent injustice about
that. And my perspective today, after 23 years
[have] passed, has become much, much different at
the end of the 23 years. Far before that I could see
the cost of money was markedly greater, and that I

would be a damn fool to prepay. So I paid
faithfully every month for 25 years, and not a day
sooner or a day later. And I'm just commenting
generally in terms of unjust or whatever. The
tension is between that to be gained and that to be
lost, I suppose, in my eyes. And I have a feeling
that class actions are a form of champerty and
maintenance in that the one that substantially gains
is the lawyer or the expert. Mr. Madsen stands to
gain little, except he has struck a blow for freedom,
I suppose, in the form that the consumer has
achieved balance.
Later the judge stated:The tension is that in terms of
the magnitude of the wear, what is to be *546
gained by Mr. Madsen is de minimis. On the other
hand, if the Court looks at economic realities, the
high cost of money, high cost of labor and high cost
of everything else, there is a societal interest in
maintaining healthy, vital financial institutions that
have the ability to fund building construction,
homes, and so forth, in our community. And I
simply observe that probably the savings and loan
associations have been very instrumental and
important in that particular process. I simply make
those as an overview statement say to [sic] what has
troubled me, and it's trouble[d] me for a long time.

[6] Canon 3 C(l)(a) states that a judge should
disqualify himself if he has "personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party." Although litigants
are entitled to a judge who will hear both sides and
decide an issue on the merits of the law and the
evidence presented, they are not entitled to a judge
whose mind is a clean slate. Each judge brings to
the bench the experiences of life, both personal and
professional. A lifetime of experiences that have
generated a number of general attitudes cannot be
left in chambers when a judge takes the bench.
Refusing to disqualify himself in Laird v. Tatum,
409 U.S. 824, 93 S.Ct. 7, 34 L.Ed.2d 50 (1972),
Justice Rehnquist responded to a motion to recuse
nunc pro tunc:
Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the
Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of
constitutional adjudication would be evidence of
lack of qualification, not lack of bias.
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[N]either the oath, the disqualification statute, nor
the practice of the former Justices of this Court
guarantees a litigant that each judge will start off
from dead center in his willingness or ability to
reconcile the opposing arguments of counsel with
his understanding of the Constitution and the law.
Id at 835, 838-39, 93 S.Ct. at 14, 15-16
(memorandum opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (emphasis
in original). One commentator has stated.Supreme
Court Justices are strong minded men, and on the
general subject matters which come before them,
they do have propensities; the course of decision
cannot be accounted for in any other way.
J. Frank, Disqualification of Judges' In Support oj
the Bayh Bill, 35 Law & Contemp. Probs. 43, 4*8
(1970). Obviously, the same is true for all judges.
Concerning comments made in court during a case,
a commentator stated:The traditional judicial view
is that if a judge can be disqualified for bias
following a comment or ruling during the court
proceedings, there is no limit to disqualification
motions and there would be a return to "judge
shopping." Any judicial comment or ruling gives
the appearance of partiality in the broadest sense to
the adversely affected party. Suppose a judge who
is the trier of fact comments during a hearing that a
parent has had the opportunity to improve himself
in order to make a home for his child but has made
no effort to do so. Can the judge be disqualified
for bias and prejudice? Whenever a judge hears
any evidence, he develops an attitude which may
change as the evidence develops. As long as the
judge decides the case only after all the evidence is
submitted, there appears to be no harm in such a
comment. Such judicial comments made before a
jury would constitute an improper expression of
opinion on the evidence, but those statements made
out of their hearing do not require recusal.
L. Abramson, Judicial Disqualification, at 23
(emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). As long
as a judge does not allow the "propensities" to
obscure the evidence and will decide the case only
after all the evidence is heard, then disqualification
is generally not warranted by a judge's comments.
See Banks v. Department of Human Resources, 141
Ga.App. 347, 348-49, 233 S.E.2d 449, 450 (1977),

overruled on other grounds,
Chancey v.
Department of Human Resources, 156 Ga.App.
338, 340, 274 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1980).
-547 Judge Rigtrup's remark that he had "cussed
financial institutions" was simply a statement about
an attitude he had had many years earlier, at a time
when he was less knowledgeable about the
operations of financial institutions. Viewed in its
entirety and in the context in which that statement
was made, there is no evidence of disqualifying bias
in Judge Rigtrup's remarks. Indeed, it appears that
Prudential saw no impropriety at the time the
remarks were made, as demonstrated by its failure
to object.

C.
[7] Prudential next contends that because Judge
Rigtrup was at one time a Prudential borrower, he
had a financial interest in the outcome of the case.
Prudential claims that the judge is either a "potential
" member of the existing plaintiff class or a "
potential" member of an alleged plaintiff class
which has never been certified. This "potential"
membership, Prudential claims, gives Judge Rigtrup
sufficient financial interest in the outcome of the
case to warrant disqualification. Prudential asserts
that amended complaints filed by the Madsens have
added new legal theories to the case and have
sought enlargement of the plaintiff class. The
result, Prudential claims, is a plaintiff class whose
boundaries are imprecise.
Notwithstanding Prudential's assertions, this case
has a precisely defined plaintiff class, consisting of
Prudential borrowers whose trust deeds contain
language identical to the Madsens' trust deed. The
class was certified by Judge Croft in 1977.
Prudential does not argue, and we find nothing in
the record to indicate, that Judge Rigtrup is a
member of that class. While it is true that the
Madsens did seek to enlarge the class, a new
plaintiff class has never been certified. Allegations
alone do not act to enlarge an existing class.
Judge Fishier held that Judge Rigtrup "may
therefore have a financial interest which would be
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substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding as defined under Canon 3C(l)(c)."
(Emphasis added.) Judge Fishier erred. Judge
Fishier and both sides on appeal have overlooked a
critical point-the meaning of the term "financial
interest" in Canon 3 C(3)(c).
Canon 3 C(3)(c) states that " 'financial interest'
means ownership of a legal or equitable interest,
however small, or a relationship as director,
advisor, or other active participant in the affairs of a
party...." (Emphasis added). In other words,
without an ownership interest, no financial interest
exists.
In Virginia EJec & Power Co. v Sun Shipbldg. &
Dry Dock Co., 407 F.Supp. 324 (E.D.Va.), vacated
sub nom on other grounds In re Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir.1976), a trial
judge was asked to disqualify himself because he
was a customer of the plaintiff public utility, and a
verdict favorable to the plaintiff could result in a
personal benefit to the judge of approximately $100
realized as a reduction in utility rates. The judge
stated:
Clearly, whatever interest the Court may have in the
subject matter in controversy, it does not constitute
a "financial interest" as defined [by the Code of
Judicial Conduct and 28 U.S.C. § 455]. It has "
ownership" of no interest-legal or equitable....
[T]he Court actually has "a vague and undefined
interest, not ownership, in a credit or accounting
adjustment...."
407 F.Supp. at 327. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on other
grounds but stated in its opinion that the trial judge
correctly concluded that "he did not 'own' a legal
or equitable interest in the subject matter." In re
Virginia Elec & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 366 (4th
Cir 1976). The appellate court noted that the trial
judge's interest was analogous to a "bare expectancy
in property law and concluded that "Judge
Warriner 'owned' just what the owner of a bare
expectancy has-nothing at all." Id at 367.
Judge Rigtrup also owned nothing. Therefore, he
had no financial interest in the case as defined by
Canon 3 C(3)(c), and disqualification on this basis

was unwarranted.

*548 D.
[8] Finally, while Prudential has not raised the
issue, we briefly examine whether Judge Rigtrup's
disqualification would be warranted under the
portion of Canon 3 C(l)(c) which calls for
disqualification when the judge or a close relative
has "any other interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding...." The
Reporter for the Code of Judicial Conduct
interpreted "any other interest" to mean an
economic interest, E. Thode, Reporter's Notes to
Code of Judicial Conduct 63-61 (1973). UnlDce
the term "financial interest," "any other interest"
does not require ownership and includes lesser
economic interests. At least one trial judge has
disqualified himself after finding that "any other
interest" includes the possibility of receiving a $100
rebate on utility payments. Virginia Elec. & Power
Co., 407 F.Supp. 324. It could therefore be argued
that Judge Rigtrup's potential membership in an
alleged class constitutes "any other interest" and
requires disqualification.
Although the term "any other interest" is usually
confined to economic interests, further definition of
the exact types of economic interests which fall
under the ambit of the term is difficult.FN6

FN6. For a discussion of the few cases
which classify noneconomic interests as "
any other interest," see L. Abramson,
Judicial Disqualification, at 65; C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, 13A
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3547, at
605 (1984). See also Health Services
Acquisition Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d
796, 800 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1986), ajfd, 486
U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d
855 (1988); Liljeberg v. Health Services
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct.
2194, 2206, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988).
In any event, the interest must be "substantially
affected" to require disqualification. Professor
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Wright has stated: "The concept [of 'any other
interest5] is necessarily an imprecise one. It has
been suggested that it should be read 'to depend on
the interaction of two variables: the remoteness of
the interest and its extent or degree.' " C. Wright,
A. Miller, & E. Cooper, 13A Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3547, at 603 (1984) (footnotes
omitted). Another frequently cited article has
illustrated the point as follows:
If the interest strongly resembles a direct
interest-for example, stock held in a subsidiary (or
parent) of the corporate party-any amount should
disqualify, just as does any stock held in the party
itself. As the interest becomes less direct, such as
that in an enterprise carrying on business with the
party, only if the extent of the interest is itself
substantial can the judge's impartiality reasonably
be questioned.

as members of the uncertified class. The Court
held that the individual justice should have recused
himself because the opinion which he had authored
had "the clear and immediate effect of enhancing
both the legal status and the settlement value of his
own case." *549475 U.S. at 824, 106 S.Ct. at 1586
. However, the Court refused to hold that the other
members of the Alabama court should have been
disqualified because of their potential status as
members of a class of plaintiffs in a class action
lawsuit. The United States Supreme Court stated:
Any interest that they might have had when they
passed on the rehearing motion was clearly highly
speculative and contingent. At the time, the trial
court had not even certified a class, let alone
awarded any class relief of a pecuniary nature....
At some point, "[t]he biasing influence ... [will be]
too remote and insubstantial...."

Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the
Federal Courts, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 736, 753 (1973)
(footnote omitted).

475 U.S. at 826, 106 S.Ct. at 1558 (quoting
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243, 100
S.Ct. 1610, 1613, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980)).

Courts which have considered the issue have
followed this approach, examining both the nature
of the interest and the extent of the interest. In In
re Virginia Elec. and Power Co., the Fourth Circuit
relied on that approach to hold that a trial judge's
interest in a possible rebate on utility payments was
a de minimis interest and that disqualification was
not required. 539 F.2d at 368. See also Alaska Oil
Co. v. Alaska, 45 Bankr. 358, 361-62 (D.Alaska
1985).

In this case, Judge Rigtrup is, at most, a potential
member of an alleged class. As such, his position
is similar to eight of the nine justices of the
Alabama Supreme Court in Aetna who might have
found themselves class members. Under those
circumstances, the United States Supreme Court
refused to find in favor of disqualification, and we
do likewise here. If any existing certified classes
are expanded to include Judge Rigtrup or any new
class were certified that included him, Judge
Rigtrup would have to disqualify himself from
further proceedings. We assume, of course, that he
would not undertake to rule on a motion to certify a
class or to expand a class if he could thereby
become a party by virtue of his ruling.

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 106
S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986), is similar in
significant respects to this case. In Aetna, the
insurer discovered after an opinion had been issued
that a justice of the Alabama Supreme Court who
was the author of the per curiam opinion had filed
two actions against insurers in state court alleging
issues nearly identical to those presented to the
court on appeal. One of the suits involved only
that justice. The other was a class action in which
the class apparently included all members of the
Alabama Supreme Court. The United States
Supreme
Court
addressed
separately
the
disqualification issue with respect to the individual
justice and the other members of the Alabama court

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOWE, Associate C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur.
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the result.
HALL, C.J., does not participate herein.
Utah,1988.
Madsen v. Prudential Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n
767P.2d538
END OF DOCUMENT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD MADSEN and
NANCY MADSEN, his wife, for
themselves and all others
similarly situated,

i
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

,

Plaintiffs,
vs .
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, for
itself and all others
similarly situated,

Defendants.

.

Civrl No. 226073

.

JUDGE KENNETH R1GTRUP

;
;
i

]
PREAMBLE

On September 4, 5, and 6, 19 85, this case was tried to
the Court without a jury.
DeBry.

Plaintiff was represented by Robert J.

Defendant was represented by Joseph Palmer and Reid E.

Lewis.
Although this is a class action, the Court has ordered
the

parties

to

present

evidence

during

this

stage

of

the

proceedings only for Madsen individually.
At the outset of the trial, Madsen made a motion to
bifurcate, and demanded a jury to hear evidence on a Statute of

C\ Pi O r\ O /,

Limitations issue: viz. when Madsen knew or should have known of
Prudential's alleged misconduct (Motion to Bifurcate, August 27r
1985).

Prudential

made

(August 30, 1985).

a Motion

to

Strike

the

Jury

Demand

The Court ruled that the discovery rule would

not toll the statute of limitations and that the request for a
jury trial was therefore denied.

In

making

its

ruling,

the

court announced that:
(a)

When the Madsens entered the contract, they got a
copy of it and they had an opportunity to read it
before they signed it.

(b)

The

contract

made

no

provision

about

interest

specifically.
(c)

The Madsens knew or should have known about the
absence of interest provisions in the contract.

(d)

The

Madsens

could

have

ascertained

Prudential's

financial circumstances if profits or interest had
been of any concern to them.
(e) The

Madsens

Prudential

were

and,

members

as

or

shareholders

such, they were

of

entitled

to

examine business records and books and obtain a
profit

and

loss

statement

and

to

inquire

into

such documents.
Prudential

contended

that
2

there

were

24

additional

issues

in the case.

Prudential timely reserved the

following

issues in this case:
(a)
or

whether,

conduct,
custom

the

and

Whether the parties intended earnings to be paid
considering

all

benefit

Madsens

practice,

the
they

circumstances,
received,

intended

a

including
and

special

the

their

industry

agreement

that

earnings not be paid.
(b)

Whether

the

parties

intended

a

true

pledge

relationship or a debtor-creditor relationship.
(c)

Whether the budget funds are pledged property or a

commingled, fungible cash deposit.
(d)

Whether Prudential was unjustly enriched by use of

the budget funds.
(e)

Whether payment of earnings on the Madsens' budget

funds has been preempted by federal law and regulations of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board as a matter of fact and of law,
since 1964.
(f)

Whether the Madsens have waived their claims, or

they are barred by estoppel or laches from asserting them.
(g)

Whether

the Madsens' budget account is a

"short

term savings account" within the meaning of 12 C.F.R. § 541.5.
Prudential made the following offer of proof to support
their affirmative defenses:
3

n n0 o qQ
v.; u <-•* ^ ^ ^

(a)

Affidavit of Edwin Calvert.

(b)

Affidavit of Gibbs Marsh.

(c)

Prudential's Answers to Interrogatories.

(d)

Prudential's Charter (1977).

(e)

Deposition of Arthur Liebold.

(f)

Deposition of plaintiff Madsen.

(g)

Documents produced by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Boai~d.

(h)

Prudential's annual reports.

(i)

Briefs on appeal.

(j)

Unspecified

testimony of Mr. Adams —

an auditor

of Prudential Federal.
The offer of proof was received and denied.

Ratherr

the Court limited the scope of this trial to whether Prudential
has earned a profit from the use of the pledged funds, and if so,
for

an

accounting

of

those

profits.

(Compare, Order, dated

September 3, 1985. )
With the case

in this procedural

posture, and after

hearing evidence of the parties, the Court enters the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Madsen entered

into

a trust

deed

contract with

Prudential on September 24, 1964.
4

n^ ° n o

2.
make

Pursuant to this contract, Madsen was required to

monthly

advance

insurance premiums.

payments

for

anticipated

taxes

and

These advance payments were known as "budget

payments."
3.

Payments were prompted by a monthly request for

payment, or a bill from Prudential to Madsen.
4.
payment.

Madsen

This

tendered

single

"budget payment".

check

a single
included

check

for

his monthly

principle, interest

Madsen submitted this monthly payment together

with a copy of the monthly bill or the billing stub.
maintained

and

separate

accounting

records

to

Prudential

credit

Madsen

for

payment of principle, interest and "budget" funds.
5.
immediately

Upon

receiving

deposited

the

each monthly
entire

payment,

check

into

Prudential

its

general

operating account.
6.

Payments for Madsen's taxes and insurance premiums

were taken out of this general account as needed periodically.
The property taxes and insurance premiums were paid by Prudential
on an annual basis.

Prudential made annual reports to Madsen

about the specific aJlocation and payment of Madsen budget funds
for taxes and insurance premiums.
7.
account

for

Prudential
routine

also

business

used
expenses

this
such

general
as

operating

office

lease

5
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payments, salaries, office machines, etc.
8.

Prudential

invests

most

surplus

funds

from

the

general operating account in short term investments such as U.S.
Treasury Bills, U.S. Treasury Notes, Certificates of Deposit, and
certain

Federal

Agency

obligations.

However, Prudential

also

uses the same general operating account to make some longer term
investments at higher yields.

Prudential earns a profit on all

of those investments.
9.

It is possible, by using Prudential's

financial

records, to determine the amount of income which Prudential has
received

by investing surplus

account.
income

funds from the general operating

The Court has also determined that a portion of that
is

attributable

to

Madsen's

"budget"

payments.

The

income attributable to Madsen's "budget" payments is set forth in
Exhibit A attached.
10.

In

computing

that

income

(paragraphs

8

and 9

above), the Court has assumed that the excess funds were invested
in short term Treasury Bills because such Treasury Bills would be
liquid

and

insurance

readily

when

due.

available
In

to

fact,

pay
in

for

Madsen's

addition

to

taxes

Treasury

and
Bill

investments, Prudential made other investments at higher yields.
11.

Prudential undergoes a number of procedural steps

in order to process tax and insurance bills, and to pay those
6

n r\ n r\ O 0,

amounts

on behalf of Madsen.

However, the Court

finds

that

Prudential would

be performing

steps

with

or

"budget"

Prudential

without

sends

a

the

monthly

many of those

payments.

statement

to

specifically

For

same

example,

Madsen.

However,

Prudential would send that same statement to request the monthly
mortgage payment even if there were no "budget" payments.
12.
has

Based upon the evidence in the record, the Court

found the costs which Prudential incurred

in handling and

managing the "budget" funds, including the cost of processing tax
and insurance payments, as included in Exhibit A.
13.

The

difference

Exhibit A represents

profits

between

income

and

expenses

or earnings which Prudential

on
has

realized by its use and investment of Madsen's "budget" funds.
14.

The Court finds it appropriate under the facts of

this case to compound on an annual basis.

The Court finds that

Prudential must disgorge these compounded profits

in order to

make

included

Madsen

whole.

The

compounded

earnings

are

in

Exhibit A.
15.
Prudential's

For the period of March 3, 1971 to June 30, 1979,
earnings

or

profits

"budget" payments amount to $109.43.

realized

by

using

Madsen's

That amount is increased to

$134.70 by compounding on an annual basis up to June 30, 1979.
16.

The

combined

table
7

of

the

Court's

findings

on

profits or earnings is attached as Exhibit A.
17 .
1979, Madsens

It was

not

received

disputed

a letter

Exhibit B of these findings
Amended

Complaint).

that

on

or about

from Prudential

July 25

reproduced at

(or, Exhibit A-l of Madsen's Third

Exhibit

B is the

letter that

Prudential

mailed out based upon Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-4.
18.

It

was

not

disputed

that

Madsens

responded

to

Prudential's letter of July 25, 1979 in a letter dated September
4, 1979, reproduced at Exhibit C of these findings (or, Exhibit B
of the Third Amended Complaint).
19 .

It was not disputed that Madsen did not withdraw

his "budget account" from Prudential after receiving Prudential's
letter of July 25, 1979.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The law of this case was set by the Utah Supreme

Court in the case of Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan
Assn., 558 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977), and by the Memorandum Decision
of the Honorable Bryant Croft dated June 14, 1977.
2.
"budget"

Specifically,

payments

made

by

the

law

Madsen

constitute a common law pledge.

of
for

the

case

taxes

is that

and

the

insurance

If Prudential has realized any

profits or earnings from the use of the pledged funds, Prudential
8
r\ r\ o f\ j". 1

must disgorge those profits to Madsen.
3.

This

4.

The

case

is

an

action

for

an

accounting

in

equity.
applicable

statute

of

limitations

case is four years, pursuant to § 78-12-25 (2)
relief not otherwise provided
fried on March 3, 1975.

for by Law."

for

this

"An action for

r

The complaint was

Therefore, the damage period shall begin

on March 3, 1971.
5.

Damages terminate on June 30 r

1979 by reason of

Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-4.
6.

Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-4 r

is not an unconstitu-

tional impairment of contract under U.S. Constitution Article I,
Section

10

or Utah

Constitution

Article

I, Section

18.

The

notice sent by Prudential to Madsen (pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 7-17-4) does not offend the due process requirements of the
U.S. Constitution or the Utah State Constitution since Madsen was
represented

by

counsel who would

effect of Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-4.

advise

him

as

to

the

legal

Furthermore, neither § 7-17-4

nor the said notice take vested rights from Madsen in violation
of Utah

Constitution

Article

I, Section

7, or the

Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution.
7.
limitations

The
until

doctrine
the

which

injured

would

party

toll

discovers

the
or

statute

of

reasonably

9

003ccr

should have discovered the harmful conduct is not applicable to
this case (see Preamble).
8.
of Madsen's

The statute of limitations is not tolled by reason
claim

that a continuing

illegal business

practice

is

deposit"

should toll the statute.
9.

The

"budget"

account

not

a

"bank

within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-34 .
10.

Prudential should be ordered to pay to Madsen the

sum of $134.70 for profits or earnings Prudential has realized by
using Madsen's "budget" payments for the period of March 3, 1971
to June 30, 1979.
11.

Madsen is entitled to his costs of action.

12.

All

class

issues

are

reserved

for

further

proceedings.
13.

Plaintiffs

shall

have

simple

interest

at

the

annual rate of 10% on the damages awarded to them in the Court's
ruling of September 6, 1985, calculated
entry of judgment.

from that date to the

Plaintiffs shall not be allowed interest for

any time prior to trial, for the reasons that the damages were
not calculable before trial, that damage calculation at trial was
subject to divergent evidence and viewpoints, especially between
the

parties'

expert

witnesses,

that

damages

required

a

determination by the Court and that the Court was required to
10

A

r.') ;\ >~ r\

* 11

^ j

select one method of calculation from among several alternatives
presented by the experts.

DATED this

IX "day of

lf\V^h^

1990.

BY THE COUR!

By:

Um^^$ZMu

HONORABLE KENNETH/TaGTRJ^P
Approved as to Form:

ROBfeRT J. DEB#Y

Approved as to Form:

n vr

(
)

^Vlukw =

JOSEPH J. PALMER
REID LEWIS

11
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the c^?/ day of
I mailed

//7uJ/l^A^

r 1990,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing A FINDINGS OF

FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, (Madsen v. Prudential), U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Joseph J. Palmer
Reid E. Lewis
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111-1901

SPl9-020\jn
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INTERNAL EXHIBIT A

R. D. MADSEN
AVERAGE ESCROW BALANCE
AND LOST INCOME AT NET U.S. T-BILL YIELDS
March 3, 1971 To June 30 1979

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

Average
Escrow
Balance

Average
T-Bill
Yield

Average
Expense
Rate on
Escrow Funds

$226.70
$2fe4.94
$157.83
$219.72
$335.73
$225.06
$318.28
$402.81
$259.84

4.33%
4.07%
7.03%
7.84%
5.80%
4.98%
5.27X
7.19%
10.07%

1.16%
1.10%
1.02%
1.00%
1.21%
1.78%
1.32%
1.25%
1.18%

Net
Earnings
On Escrow
Funds

Net Yield
3.17%
2.97%

6.0lfe
6.76%
4.59%
^.20%
3.95%
5.94%
8.89%

TOTALS;
r —

^SBl V PRUDENTIAL

••

Cumulative
Net
Earnings
Compounded

$5.97
S8.46
$9.49
$14.85
$15.41
$7.20
$12.57
$23.93
$11.55

$5.97
$15.04
$25.72
$42.56
$60.99
$72.06
$89.34
$119.34
$134.70

$109.43

$134.70

'
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INTERNAL EXHIBIT B

^

l ( j v ; l K VI

At I ( M I N I S 1 UU I'AVMl X I ()1

1 A \J_ S A M I I W I J K A N * L

A* of J u l y I . 1V7*^ l ' l i n K - n l u l I K I J u l N4\ju|-\ *ill n - l.-n|Vf l o j n u f j j « - v r U ' J i i o n i i l 1/1
Conjunction

willi yt*ur i m u t p j j . c l i u n f««/ (lie p.tyi«»--««l " ^ » , r ; 1 ' «**iai»- p m p c ' 1 ' ) * l-»*ci. m -

j u t a n t c j>fcn»l||«i.

t,r

" t l i c r clt.t/^cs.

Y o u i i u y iu»* du»«»\c o n e <if Il»c l o l l u ^ m c

l^o

dj'titiiis:

A.

^ fMi i t u y ti'olujiH- w»tir rtiiitilitlr p.rvn»rnl .i< K IKIW p r o v i d e d for in
)••!« l*i.in d.'LtiuK-iiU Ui l»c «lrj-»v*i.*t IM j ••«•!! iHii-it*\t I»CJMIIJ; i c \ c * c
: i i t t « t i u i . \\c u ill i«>fiiiiiin* (.i JN..1I.I.- U M I Ihc VCIVICV uf r.»ymj: > o m
fMMjvily IJ»WV . m d / o r i m u f j i u f p i c m i u i n v 3l n o cu%l .n t h e y b c u u m c
thic:ur.

H

Y««n in.i} i*l. «.( in .i%Miffii* flu- J-.j*_»I i« sj-«nvjhjl»tv l««r llic p.i> ntcfil i'f
ihv'v*' .ivv«*ssimni\ .IIKI p i y \«««t« «»%\ti it'.tl rvr.it <* p m p e ' l y ta«.cs. m Mti.itu't: p r c i n n n i i s uit%i n l h c r chjijrrv J \ Ilicy i*rx*un»c Ji>'..

Jf y o u cho«ivi* Upl»»ut A . no I . ' S | " H M - IN I H T C ^ N J I V
V..* will C"ftlin<k" «•» pii»»itli* i h f ifi *vivvs tif juy"»c. tlu*w : i \ 4 " t u m ' i i i < u i l l u t u i U K I in \-»u
II yr«u t l».»«tve* Orli«»n ^ . ' h e
rnCifX-Oil CJi*l ttxttsl 1»C i i p i c d -i«wl u - t u r n c d l«! «•<»/ H I I I U l»y S c p l c m l i c r j . 1V?V. H c n c
i e n d I ins cm J U>:
]*i iui«-nli^! 1 v«l« u l N.ivinj:\ j»ul l i u n ANVCK i j l i ' t i i
V (J. lt.n l.^un
-S:xlJ I A c C n v . Ululi K-1II5
Allrulinn:

Moi Ijinjtc L U J I I S i ' M u m r .

*Pjsni m n j » ( *'l fW i.i*«! ifulu-iltui: t!» it \ « M I wi.li !•« p.f.* )<M<I ««-.WI I . ( ' . va in<.ut.nut' .nwl
oilier rhrairr* , t t l 3 d t i t ' c l l«:tvrc. w-e u i l l i r t i i i n I " \*«n t h e purvent h-d-wicc tH y u n r reserve
b c c o z m l -iml a i i p ' i i yunr m o n t h l y j u v n i r n l i i C i n u l m r l v
* While rMnit-»»»*-iI »^ r . ' M ' i i U i l 1»\ I r t U i . i t .uui n-«l S I . I U I .n«: m m.tt K i \ •Ir^liM^ Willi TliC
l l r n t n . «if j U»-in u m l u i l . l h c o j ' l i o n ^ j i scl Uull» li-.-u-m .iu* itiiiM^K'nl ^ill» Hu p n n i M u n s
| i i Utah I a x e
|1:IIC]«>MIIL'

fclj Op(.,m t *:«t*I

n ^o o

A ^/

INTERNAL EXHIBIT C

cCKTiri?:!) M A . J . .

,<i)dcn t i a 1 F e d e r a l S a v i n g s t Lo.m /.:.:;oc: i a t i o n
J5 S o u t l i M a m S t r e e t
L i t ^ k c C i t y . U t a h D4111
He:

: < i c h a r d a n d Nancy .v--»d:cr*n
Loan N'o. 33S-01^f. 1 1 - 0

Gen 11 c»»cn :
Mr. and Mrs. Madscn have consulted this office in
with your letter of July 2 5, 19 79 entitled. Notice
0 Homeowners. - Reserve Accounts for Payments of Taxes and
lrnTurancc.

coanccLion

It appear:; that yonr letter is in violation of the
express provisions of the Interest on Hort^acc .Loan Reserve
Accounts Act. S 7-17-1. c: tE}i" ' l-,-**l!l <-"odc Ann.* (1953).
Specifically, your letter has c]ajn.od protection under
5*7-17-4 Utah Code Ann. [l'J53); however, <; 7-rJ7-'J is clearly
not applicable to the Madscn contract. That section provides
in part:
(1) A lender not requiring the establishment
and ir^intcnancc of a reserve account shall
offer the borrower the following options:
We have examined the Kadscn contract- As you hnov,
the contract contains a provision requirinq the riadscr. s to
make monthly payments into the" Reserve Accounts ^-^c arc'told
by the Kad'scns that they had no choice in the natter. The
contract was presented to them on a "take it or leave it"
basis. In short. Prudential has already "required ~ the >Vadsens
to pay into the reserve account, and that requirement has been
reduced to a written agreement. That recruircnent vill, -of
course, continue to exist for the life of the contract. Thus
it seems fair to conclude that the existing contract constitutes
a continuing requirement.

:-.'e :if: nut aware of :.ny .locirinc by which I'rudL-ncicl
can now "urircrjuirc" a reserve account - Stated in other w o r d s ,
P r u d e n t i a l c i n n o t un i 1 a t c:r.">J ly cha:'i«;<* ;'nC critter, c o n t r a c t .
Nor can
the l e g i s l a t u r e change the w r i t t e n contract.
T h i s a n a l v s i s in con f i rm-':d by the- u*c of the w o r d
and in the first s e n t e n c e of S 7-17-4.
N o t e that the w o r d
a_mi is i"
the c o n j u n c t ive.
In other word:;, Prudential is
e n t i t l e d to the p r o t e c t i o n of 5 7-17--3 only w h e r e both c o n d i t i o n s
exist c o n j u n c t i v e l y :
F i r s t , the lender does not require the
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a reserve a c c o u n t ,

scconti, the lender doer, not requir-c the
ma in t ••nc-nce of a reserve a c c o u n t .
I'r.i-l'-ni. i:d can never ~at. is!y both? of rh*v.e condition:;
on c x i c t i n u Jo.i:is.
liven jf Prudential rlocr r.ot rc-qjire the
r.^inLCii.'::icc* of a reserve- account in fui.-.irn; Prudential h a s
n o n e t h e l e s s a l r e a d y rencircd such a r e s e r v e for tLhc pant s e v e r a l
years..
T h e ror.orvc account lias already beim e s t a b l i s h e d .
Tims''
P r u d e n t i a l can nc\:cr
satisfy the 1 i rr-t r o n d i t i o n of S* 7 - 1 7 - M .
On the o t h e r hand, 5 7-17-2, Utah
i r. d r a f t e d in :.nc di :;i imct i ve :

Code Ann.

(l r JS3),

(1) Mach lender requiring the en tabl i:;.hmen t.
or c o n t i n u a n c e of -a reserve account''i~H c o n n e c t i o n vith an c>:i ::t inc: or future z~hl
estate
loan shall pay interest on fund:; d e p o s i t e d in
the a c c o u n t after June 3 0 , 197 9 c.r at least
-11 -j i .-nj--le interest per anncm ....
T h u s , P r u d e n t i a l would fall u n d e r 5 7-17-3 if it had
rercuired the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a reserve a c c o u n t or if P r u d e n t i a l
required the c o n t i n u a n c c . of a reserve a c c o u n t .
P r u d e n t i a l has
a l r e a d y r e q u i r e d the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the r e s e r v e account by
contract:
Tim.', $ 7-17-3 is satisfied.
S i n c e the s t a t u t e is
d ra f t e*d in tin: d i s j unc i ivo, it r ca 11 y na y.t'S n o r: i f f c :" en C c " a t
all that r r c d e a t i a i r.\z\y r.nir.ehov; d i s c o n t i n u e that recu i rerr.cnt
in the f u t u r e ^
S e c t i o n 7-17-3 is satisfied si:t::;Jy b e c a u s e
Pruv.cat: :»1 r^-.'jirc-j the ~CF.c.rv<: a c c o u n t in the c:-:istine c o n t r a c t .
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Three

j- is not ncccns:.ry that both conditions be satisfied.
This all bulls clovn to .« f.iirJy simple scenario,
prudential h»is r.cnt out a scries of letters announcing that
(•he i>o 3 icy of rcuuirinij a rt^ui'vc a'jr. %:••.:; it has been reversed.
prudential nc::: claims ch.u it ir. entitled to the protection
of S 7-17-< because it has no ;-oJi'ry. f'^r-ui r J n«:j a reserve
.nccount. The fallacy in ull o( L h J r jr. that the rcc:u i renent
for a reserve account arises froir a con c r j c t — n o : a t>ol icy.
The contract continues to c>:ist. 3t cannot be chanucd at the
rncrc wnim and caprice of Prudential. The con: ract constitutes
3 continuing i*e*ju i rcmc-.ni . Since lT'idi-n t la ] ' s contract requires
the reserve account, the t ransaction falls under 5 7-1*7-3.
In vicv/ of the foregoing, vc arc convinced that the
Hadscn contract doc:; not Tall under 5 7-17-4.- Thus, pursuant
Xjj $ 7-17-U(2), Utah Code- Ann. (19r>3), ^c he rev i th demand
payment of interest pursuant to 5 7-17-3, Utrh Code /-sin. (1V53).
If you fail to honor this deirjand, it is O'jr^-intcr.t to file suit
pursuant to 5 7 - 1 7 - B U ) , Utah Code Ann. (19-55).
If is further ii'^pi'o.nt that Prudentiul "bas sent
similar or identical notices to other borrowers. Therefore/
pursuant to 5 7-17-3(2), Utah Code Ann. (1953), we make this
demand OTI beha I : of the ;n;!:;nis .i:-\\l all other borrowers _of
Prudential similarly situated.
Moreov-.-r, we arc- informed that every lending
institution in Utah has sent letters in s-.ibstan.ee ar.d .effect
identical tu the Madscn letter. It is i r. conceivable that all
of these lend 2 u-.; institutions could nisread the s ir.pl c lancuaac
of the statute.
leather, wc conclude that: this :.;ar3llcl conduct'
is the result of * conspiracy by Utah 3 endi.-,'; ir.s tit ut ions to
circumvent the r»-euir enents of L* 7-}~.:-2. P.y reason of such
industry-vi.de- practice and conspiratorial conduct, all" Utah
lend in 9 institutions are juridically related and subject to
treatment as a defendant class under Kulc 2 3 of die Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Thus, by copy o f this letter, v:c .T.ake
demand under 5 7-17-3(2) on bchaif 01 all borrowers in the

StOUC oC ULJih u-lio IKIVC r c c c i vcxi l«-t L-'fN :rom .\:.y i»i*ih lond<
i n s u b s ^ n c r nn*.\ e f f e c t «> i r.:i ] .1 r I t . i l i r >:.i'l::^n 1-.titer.
."inc^rclr

your

j-;niK!rL J.

i^.-liry

J

JUD/chh
cc;:

be:

Al 3 U t a h i i t . ' i t c li;i:ih:;;
A l l N a t i o n a l i i a n h s wiLli L h c i i
- p r i n c i p a l p l » i c e of busiric-s.*; i n t i i c S t . i t o of U t a h ;
A l l S t a t e f » : i v i n c ; 3 / r : i i i l i l ) n n s .inJ I-o-^n A s s o c V o t i o n s
w i t h t h e i r p r i n c i p a l pJ :iCiv of Lr.:::£ m : s s I n L:iC:
f.rnLe o f i'i :iii;
Al 1 IV-»h-r;i 1 f.:i \*i n.;::/i:-ji 2.1 1 •••: .in-.: l - o n -i:::;'.'Ci.iLioni
w i t h t h e i r p r i n c i p:;l :«] a'-i ,».r l.asifiv:-.^ i n t h e
S t a t e o f ».:L.ih.
Mr.

Richard

Kadscn

WALLACE R. BENNETT - A02 8 6
1723 South 2100 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84108
Telephone: (801) 581-1516
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A084 9
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD MADSEN and
NANCY MADSEN, his wife, for
themselves and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

MOTION THAT MASTER PERFORM AN
AUXILIARY COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES
(AT PLAINTIFFS' EXPENSE) FOR
PERIODS PRIOR TO MARCH 3, 1971
AND FOR PERIODS AFTER JUNE 3 0,
1979

vs.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Defendant/Appellee.

Trial No. 750226073
Civil no. C79-8404
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP

This Court has previously entered Orders that the Master
compute damages for class members for the period March 3, 1971 to
June 30, 1979.
Plaintiffs move for an Order that the Master perform an
auxiliary computation of damages (at plaintiffs' expense) for the
Periods prior to March 3, 1971 and after June 30, 1979. In support
°f this Motion, plaintiffs' rely on the memorandum filed herewith.

tilth • . 1996.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
•)
i

j^iif
LArrn

1/.,/

ROBERT J . DEBR1

(JJ'MI^OA- Ot^i+lf
WALLACE R. BENNETT
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION THAT MASTER PERFORM AN AUXILIARY COMPUTATION OF
DAMAGES (AT PLAINTIFF'S EXPENSE) FOR PERIODS PRIOR TO MARCH 3, 1971
AND FOR PERIODS AFTER JUNE 30, 1979
HAND DELIVERED this

3d

fad-

day of

(Madsen v. Prudential) , was
, 1996, to the following:

Joseph J. Palmer
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
175 East 400 South, #900
SLC, UT 84111

via hand delivery

Edwin Erickson (Master)
HANSEN, STEED, BRADSHAW & MALMROSE
2 61 East Broadway, Suite 10 0
SLC, UT 84111

via hand delivery

'
sp!9.114/lk
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WALLACE R. BENNETT - A02 8 6
1723 South 2100 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84108
Telephone: (801) 581-1516
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A084 9
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD MADSEN and
NANCY MADSEN, his wife, for
themselves and all others
similarly situated,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION THAT MASTEI
PERFORM AN AUXILIARY COMPUTATIOl
OF DAMAGES (AT PLAINTIFFS'
EXPENSE) FOR PERIODS PRIOR TO
MARCH 3, 1971 AND FOR PERIODS
AFTER JUNE 30, 1979

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,

Trial No. 750226073
Civil no. C79-8404

Defendant/Appellee.

HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP

This Court has previously ordered the Master to prepare
a damage computation for all class members for the period March 3
1971 to June 30, 1979.

The court selected the June 30, 1979 cut

off by reason of § 78-12-25(2), Utah Code Ann.
Law No. 4, March 22, 1990.)

(See Conclusion o

The court selected the June 30, 197

cut-off by reason of § 7-17-4, Utah Code Ann.

(See Conclusion o

Law No. 5, March 22, 1990.)
These

cut-off

dates

were

vigorously

plaintiffs, and they are not free from doubt.

contested

b

However, those cut

off dates now stand, and the Master is poised to begin a monumental
task of computing damages for up to 10,000 class members for the
above-described window of time.
This case is now over 2 0 years old.

If the court erred

in computing the cut-off dates, the supreme court would be required
to send the Master back
outside that window.

to recompute the damages

for periods

Of course, the Master would then be required

to reassemble all of the records and start all over again.

More

years would be added.
It is respectfully submitted that the risk of delaying
this case for even more years can be avoided by simply permitting
the Master, at plaintiffs7 expense,1 to perform damage computations
for time periods which plaintiffs believe to be relevant.
an

appellate

court

comes

to

a

different

conclusion,

Then, if
on

the

applicable window of time, it would be a simple matter to adjust
the amount of the judgment.
Finally, plaintiffs have offered to pay the cost of the
Master

for this

supplemental

calculation;2 however, plaintiffs

specifically offer to pay only the incremental increase, and not a
pro-rata share.

For example, the current damage window is approx-

imately 8 years.
for an additional

Plaintiffs might seek an auxiliary computation
(say) 16 years.

1

However, plaintiffs are not

If the Appellate Court reverses this Court on the applicable
window of time, plaintiffs reserve the right to claim reimbursement
for these costs in any subsequent proceeding.
2

But see fn. 1.
2

offering to pay 2/3s (or 16/24ths) of the Master's cost.

Rather

defendant should pay the entire cost of the core -- 8 year study.

Plaintiffs would then pay the incremental cost of th<

actual time needed for the Master to keep extending his computa
tions for the extra years.

DATED

this

Ai

d a y of

(liMjuL , i9 9 6 .
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
/"\
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ROBERT J. DEBRY

WALLACE R. BENNETT

3

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION THAT MASTER PERFORM AN
AUXILIARY

COMPUTATION

OF DAMAGES

(AT PLAINTIFF'S

EXPENSE)

FOR

PERIODS PRIOR TO MARCH 3, 1971 AND FOR PERIODS AFTER JUNE 30, 1979
(Madsen v.

Prudential),

was

HAND

DELIVERED

this

day

to the following:
Joseph J. Palmer
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
175 East 400 South, #900
SLC, UT 84111

via hand delivery

Edwin Erickson (Master)
HANSEN, STEED, BRADSHAW & MALMROSE
261 East Broadway, Suite 100
SLC, UT 84111

via hand delivery
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LAW OFFICE

4252 South 700 East

ROBERT J. DEBRY
AND

Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Ph (801)262-8915

ASSOCIATES

Fx (801)262-8995

1425 South State Street
Orem, Utah 84097
Ph (801) 802-7224
Fx (801)802-7230
^(800)574-5601

vyv.ToJb'Sfta e'ifrf. e

' t

Judicial

JORGE
243 East St. George Blvd. S

January 10, 2002

St George, Utah 84770
Ph (435) 656-0198
Fx (435)688-9421
Toll Free (800) 909-3500
QGDEN
3340 S Harrison Blvd Ste
Ogden, Utah 84403

Edwin Erickson, CPA
HANSEN, BRADSHAW, MALMROSE & ERICKSON
261 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Mad sen v Prudential- Aggregate Accounting

Ph (801)392-9800
Fx (801)392-9400
Toll Free (888) 786-2824

-15 v

L?D'

Dear Mr Erickson,
According to the Court's Order of January 2, 2002 (copy attached) you will now be
performing the statistical computation for aggregate class damages Of course, the window for
those computations (as ordered by Judge Rigtrup) will be March 3, 1971 to June 30, 1979.
However, we would like to remind you that the court has given us permission to have you
preform an auxiliary computation of damages (at our expense) for the time period prior to March
3, 1971 and after June 30, 1979. (Motion, Memo and Order attached.) Also note from p. 2 and
p 3 of the attached memorandum that we will be paying only the incremental increase in your fee
for computing these damages.
Unless we hear from you to the contrary, we are assuming that you will be performing
these auxiliary calculations at the same time as you prepare the core calculations for the years
1971 to 1979
Sincerely,
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES

Robert J DeBiy/
Attorney

Attachments

cc

Steven Tingey
Judge Burton

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY
MADDEN,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
: CASE NO. 750226073CV

vs.

:

HONORABLE ANNE M. STIRBA
MARCY THORNE, COURT CLERK

PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Defendant.

On January 9,

1998,

the above-entitled matter came on for oral

argument on several motions.

At the hearing, the parties were

represented by their respective counsel.

The motions argued and

submitted include the following: (1) Prudential's Renewed Motion to
Decertify;

(2) Prudential's Motion

to Amend Bench Ruling;

(3)

Prudential's Amended Motion for Instructions to the Master; (4)
Plaintiffs' Motion (and Second Motion) to Amend Conclusion of Law
#5;

(5) Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Conclusion

of Law #13 or

Finding of Fact #15 and Prudential's Motion to Amend Conclusion of
Law #10 and #13 and Finding of Fact #14 and #15; (6) Plaintiffs'
Motion to Amend Conclusion of Law Based Upon New Case Law and
Motion

to Reopen the Trial

for the Limited

Purpose of Making

Findings on Statute of Limitations Issue; (7) Plaintiffs' Motion
for Order that Prudential is not Entitled to Any Reversion of
Unclaimed

Funds; and

(8) Plaintiffs' Motion

to Enlarge

/

Class

^f

S\

I

2

MADDEN v. PRUDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Definition.
At the conclusion of oral argument, the Court took the motions
under advisement.

The Court has now carefully considered the

motions, the written memoranda and exhibits supporting the motions,
the arguments of counsel and the good cause that has been shown.
Based upon the forgoing, the Court hereby enters the following
ruling.
BACKGROUND
1.

The Madsens are trustors as well as representatives of a

certified class of borrowers.

Prudential Federal Savings and Loan

Association is both the trustee and the beneficiary under a deed of
trust executed September 21, 1964, for the purpose of securing a
promissory note in the sum of $16,800.

The security conveyed was

the home in which plaintiffs reside.
2.

Plaintiffs,

as

the

trustors,

agreed

to

protect

the

security of Prudential by paying the insurance and taxes.

Ir

addition, they agreed to pay ^budget payments" and pledge these
additional amounts to the beneficiary as additional security for
the full performance of the deed of trust and the note securec
thereby.
3.
Provision

Contending

that

the

monthly

budget

4 of their contract constitute

payments

undei

a common law pledge,

plaintiffs sought restitution of profits allegedly earned.
4.

This

action was tried

in

September

1985 before the
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Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup.

Judge Rigtrup entered Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law in 1990.
plaintiffs'

claims

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The case was tried only as to

individually,

and

the

class

claims

were

reserved.
5.

On December 2, 1996, Judge Rigtrup entered his bench

ruling concerning the definition of the purported class represented
in this action.
6.
bench.
by

the

On December 31, 1996, Judge Rigtrup retired from the
Subsequently, on April 21, 1997, the case was re-assigned
presiding

judge

of

the

Third

District

Court

to

the

undersigned.
7.

On October 31, 1997, this Court entered Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law as to the definition of the purported class
represented in this action.
ANALYSIS
This

case

was

initially

filed

undersigned judge started law school.

in

1975:

the

year

the

The case is now nearly 23

years old.
Most of these current motions seek a reconsideration by this
Court of several issues already decided by Judge Rigtrup and other
judges a long time ago.

Because of the extremely protracted nature

of this case, the Court feels compelled to express its serious
concern over the repeated attacks on legal issues that have been
considered and decided previously (in some instances by more than

MADDEN v .

4

PRUDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM DECISION

one judge) . *
This approach is not the product of just one side of the
dispute.

Both sides have engaged in requests for reconsideration.1

Based upon the Court's consideration of the current motions,
there is no adequate basis in law or fact for reconsideration of
(1) Prudential's Renewed Motion to Decertify; (2)

Prudential's

Motion to Amend Bench Ruling; (3) Prudential's Amended Motion for
Instructions to the Master; (4) Plaintiffs' Motion (and Second
Motion) to Amend Conclusion of Law #5; and (5) Plaintiff's Motion
to Amend Conclusion of Law #13 or Finding of Fact #15; and these
motions are, consequently, denied.
Prudential's "Motion to Amend Conclusion of Law #10 and #13
and Finding of Fact #14 and #15," is hereby denied, except that
Judge Rigtrup's award to plaintiffs of the simple interest at th€
annual rate of 10% on damages from the date of the conclusion oi
trial but prior to the entry of judgment, is hereby vacated on the
ground a judgment is entered when the judgment is actually signec
and

entered,

and

an

award

of

prejudgment

is,

therefore

inappropriate.
As to Plaintiffs' "Motion to Amend Conclusion of Law Base
Upon New Case Law and Motion to Reopen the Trial for the Limite
Although the parties contend that the law authorizes th
Court to reconsider these issues, perhaps they ought to give mor
consideration as to whether, in good judgment and conscience, ther
ought to be a reconsideration.

i
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Purpose

of Making

Findings

MEMORANDUM DECISION

on Statute

of

Limitations

Issue,"

plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the use of the discovery
rule is justified under Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125
(Utah

1992);

and, therefore, there

is no basis under

Sevy v.

Security Title, 902 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995), to amend the Conclusions
of Law or to re-open the trial.
With regard to Plaintiffs' "Motion for Order that Prudential
is not Entitled to Any Reversion of Unclaimed Funds," a ruling on
this motion is deferred until such time as the Court considers
other possibly competing claims on the judgment proceeds at the
conclusion of the case.

At this time, there are simply too many

unknowns regarding the number of claimants, the amount owed to
each,

and the amounts

appropriately resolved.

to be disbursed,

for

this

issue to be

The notice to submit as to this motion is

therefore hereby stricken.

The motion may be re-submitted for

decision at such time as the Court considers all other claims on
the judgment proceeds.
Finally, the issues raised in Plaintiffs' "Motion to Enlarge
Class

Definition"

are

remanded

to

the

Special

Master

for

an

assessment and recommendation, in accordance with the directives
previously established by Judge Rigtrup, as to whether the class
includes

those parties

in trust deed

contracts

identified

as

documents 12, 14 & 15 on Exhibit C of the Master's initial Report
dated

February

22,

1995.

The

Special

Master

shall

file

an

Hansen, Bradshaw, Malmrose & Erickson
A Professional Corporation
F

«ggg &* a* &****«»**_

CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
559 West 500 South
Bountiful, Utah 840)0
801-296-0200
Fax 801-296-1218

March 1, 2002
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^ - ^ Deputy Clerk
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Honorable Michael K. Burton
Third Judicial District Court
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Dear Judge Burton:
This letter is our Report to the Court as required by the Court in its Order
dated January 2, 2002. This Order specified the following:
The Master shall, within 60 days of this order, produce to the Court a Report
giving the Master's final statistical calculation of aggregate class damages.
Furthermore for purposes of this report, if the mailing address and the
property address are identical on the Mortgage Loan Master Reference Card
(sample attached), the Master shall assume that such loans involve ''primary
residence", as that terms is used in prior Orders of the Court.
To accomplish this objective I met with Brad Slack at Washington Mutual to
review the data base that he had prepared of the loan origination cards. This data
base was prepared by Mr. Slack and other Washington Mutual Bank employees
under his direction, as outlined in his August 7, 2000 affidavit filed with the Court.
This process resulted in a data base of 14,482 loan cards. It should be noted that I
have only performed a limited amount of testing of this data base, primarily in
obtaining a sample of 50 loan cards to respond to plaintiff counsel's request of
December 27, 2000. I have not yet performed testing to determine if all loan cards
have been properly segregated between class members and non-members of the
class. Based on the limited testing I have performed and based on my meetings and
discussions with Mr. Slack, I have seen no evidence that the process of segregating
the loan cards and developing the data base was not performed with due care.
The data base includes information regarding the mailing address of the
borrower, as well as the property address as listed on each loan origination card.
We requested that Mr. Slack print the entire data base and mark each borrower
name where the loan address and property address did not agree. In performing this
task, he also noted a third group of borrowers; those where it is not possible to
determine if the mailing address and the property address are the same. There are
two primary reasons for this classification; the first is when the property address is
listed on the card but the mailing address is a P.O. box, the second is when a legal
description of the property is listed as the property address. Mr. Slack marked this
third category as well on the printout of the database.

After Mr. Slack completed the process of marking the data base printout for
the three different categories, we obtained the printout from him. We tested the
accuracy of his work by reviewing the printout and looking for any items which
appeared to be improperly classified, based on the information listed. We found a
small number of exceptions, and met with Mr. Slack to discuss the exceptions. He
then made the appropriate corrections on the printout.
We then met again with Mr. Slack to sort the data base into the three
categories:
1.
2.
3.

Borrowers where the mailing address and property address agree.
Borrowers where the mailing address and property address did not
agree.
Borrowers where it was indeterminable if the mailing address and
property address agree.

As noted above, there were 14,482 total loans in the data base. This sorting
process identified 10,796 loans in category 1, 3,192 loans in category 2, and 494
loans in category 3. Of the 10,796 loans in category 1 where the addresses match,
there are 1,249 loans which are duplicated on the listing. Of the 494 loans in
category 3, 30 are duplicate loans within the listing and an additional 57 are
duplicates when compared to category 1. Duplication occurs primarily from
assumption of the same loan by one or more subsequent borrowers. We considered
whether duplicate loan numbers should be included in the estimate of aggregate
damages and concluded they should be excluded. We arrived at this conclusion
after considering the methodology used by Prudential in conducting its sample in
1993, from which we use data as described below in developing our estimate of
aggregate damages. After subtracting the duplicate borrowers, the adjusted total of
category 1 loans (where the property and mailing address match) was 9,547.
As discussed in our Report to the Court dated December 31, 1996,
Prudential used the December 31, 1972 mortgage loan microfiche records as the
population for its sample. For each of the 400 loans selected in its sample,
Prudential obtained the annual statement summaries for the loan for each year from
1971 to 1979. The damage calculations were performed for the entire period the
loan was outstanding from 1971 to 1979, whether the loan was assumed or not.
Prudential's damage calculations for its sample were on a per loan basis, rather than
per individual borrower.
As noted in our December 31, 1996 Report to the Court, the amount of
damages for the 227 potential class loans from the sample totaled 23,875.69, or an
average of $105.18 per class member or loan. For the purposes of this Report as
directed by the Court, we believe this per loan sample average is meaningful and can
be used to develop our estimate of aggregate damages, as follows:
Number of loans where property address
and mailing address agree
Average damages per loan, from 1993 sample,
for period March 3, 1971 to June 30, 1979
Estimate of aggregate damages

9,547
$ 105.18
$1,004 J 53

This aggregate damage estimate excludes any judgement interest subsequent
to June 30, 1979.
If the category 3 or indeterminable loans were included in the above estimate,
they would increase the estimate by a maximum of $42,808 if all of the nonduplicate total of 407 loans were found to be category 1 loans.
As previously noted, the completeness and accuracy of the data base has not
been extensively tested. I would point out that the process used by Washington
Mutual to develop this data base resulted in 9,547 loans identified, as described
above. Our December 31, 1996 report to the Court arrived at an estimated 9,648
class members, based on the 1993 sample performed. The sample estimate of 9,648
is a close approximation of the 9,547 arrived at by individual examination of loan
cards by Washington Mutual to prepare the data base, and provides additional
evidence of the overall reasonableness of the class member size. While the exact
number of class members may not be known at the present time, I believe we have a
reasonable estimate of class member loans that can in turn be used to provide an
overall estimate of aggregate damages.
The following are certain of the statistical parameters used by Prudential in
their 1993 sample of 400 loans:
Population Estimate:
n
X-BAR
N
X-HAT

100
94.96
16,941
1,608,639

:nce Interval Data:
Standard Deviation
Finite Correction Factor
Standard Error
Reliability Level (Two-sided)
Confidence Coefficient
Precision

118.42
0.99704
200,030
95%
1.96
392,059

Please contact me regarding any questions concerning the information in
this letter.
Respectfully submitted,

£Jw^{:m&*!>^
Edwin L. Erickson, CPA
ELExp

Hansen, Bradshaw, Malmrose & Erickson
A Professional Corporation
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
559 West 500 South
Bountiful Unh 84010
801 296 0200
Fax 801 296 1218

September 12, 2003

PIonoiablcL A Devei
Third Judicial District Court
450 South State Stieet
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
RE

Madsen vs Prudential
Civil No C79-8404
Trial No 750226073

Dear Judge Dever
This lettei is in lesponse to Plaintiffs motion that the Court oidei the
Master to Appeal and Show Cause why he Should not be Held in Contempt of
Court dated Julv 10, 2 0 0 \ and to Plaintiff s ReoK to Prudential's Memotandum in
Opposition to Madsens' Motion that Special Mastei Show Cause Wny lie Shou'd
Not be Held m Contempt, dated August 27, 2003
I apologize to the Couit lot not lesponJiug soonei, 1 mistakenly assumed
the Court would order me to appear and respond to the original motion if deemed
necessary by the Couit
To prepare my response, I have obtained and reviewed the May ^0, 2003 and
August 26, 2003 affidavits of Andiew Carr Conway, Ji , as well as defendant's
Memorandum in Opposition to Madsens' Motion that Special Mastei Show Cause
Why He Should Not be Held in Contempt dated August 4, 2003
It appeals the main aiguments piesented by Mi Conway and plaintiffs
counsel is that I have not followed niofcssional sldndaids and that I have tued to
deceive the Couit Specifically, they allege my use of "negative assuiance' in my
March I, 2002 Repott to the Couit violates ceitain Geneially Accepted Auditing
Standaids (GAAS) they believe aie applicable to the woit I have peilorned a^
Special Mastei They also allege deceit on my part for not disclosing that my repoit
violated piolessional standards, as well as foi claiming that I had perfoimed a
limited amount of testing ol the loan caid data base My response to these
allegations follows

Alleged Violation of Professional Standards
Mr. Conway, on page 3 of his August 26, 2003 affidavit, states his professional opinion is
that "the requirements within the professional literature for consulting engagements are parallel to
those in the 'audit literature' ". He concludes that "sufficient relevant data" under Consulting
Services Standards is similar or even parallel to evidential matter as discussed in GAAS (AU
Section 326). He concludes in paragraph II that my use of "negative assurances" in my March 1,
2002 Report are improper and violate GAAS and/or Consulting Services Standards. On page 2 of
his affidavit, he also questions the ability of Mr. Tingey and Ms. Maragakis to make judgments
about "what constitutes an audit" as recognized by the accounting profession.
For the record, I have been a CPA for over 25 years. I have worked almost exclusively as
an audit staff member, senior, manager, senior manager and partner for two national CPA firms and
for a local CPA firm. I have also taught audit courses at the university level for two years. Based
on my experience and background, let me state clearly THIS ENGAGEMENT IS NOT AN
AUDIT. Mr. Conway's criticisms of my using negative assurances are based o^ prohibilions of
using such assurances in expressing an audit opinion. He also states in his May 30, 2003 affidavit
on page 12 that "such language is called 'negative assurance' and is generally viewed with
disapproval by the accounting profession except in certain very limited circumstances". I disagree
that this language is viewed "with disapproval" and only used in "very limited circumstances". A
few examples will suffice.
When CPAs issue a review report on financial statements under AICPA Statements on
Standards for Accounting and Review Services, they are required to use negative assurance, i.e.,
"We are not aware of any material modifications that should be made to the accompanying
financial statements ...". Similarly, when a CPA reports on compliance with contractual provisions
or regulatory requirements related to audited financial statements, he is required to "provide(s)
negative assurance relative to compliance with the applicable covenants of the agreement insofar as
they relate to accounting matters, and specify that the negative assurance is being given in
connection with the audit of the financial statements". (AU 623, para 20 (c)). Finally, when CPAs
issue "comfort letters" to underwriters in connection with unaudited financial statements included
in public offerings, they are "limited to providing negative assurance on compliance as to form and
content of financial statements..." (AU 634.34). I believe these examples clearly demonstrate
negative assurance is commonly used and not "viewed with disapproval by the accounting
profession".
As for my reason for using negative assurance in my March 1, 2002 Report, I clearly felt
this was the most appropriate and descriptive language, given the limited amount of work I had
performed to that point. I was careful to point out, both on page 1 and page 3 of my Report, that the
loan data base had not been extensively tested. Based on the testing ] had performed, I felt it would
have been irresponsible of me to express positive assurance that all loan cards had been properly
segregated. Remarkably, plaintiffs counsel confuses the issue o\^ my providing negative assurance
in my Report to falsely stating in their August 27, 2003 Memorandum "he (the Master) relied on
'negative assurances' from officers of Prudential in preparing that March 1, 2002 Report." I
assume this misstatement was an honest mistake on Counsel's part and not "deceit"!
At this point, a little background may be helpful. In the hearing before Judge Burton on
January 2, 2002, and in previous motions before the Court, there was discussion of whether class
damages would be calculated on an individual or aggregate basis. Judge Burton ordered a
"statistical calculation of aggregate class damages" using certain criteria to define class members.
Also, both sides in this case have repeatedly made reference to ''certain appeals" of the Court's
final decisions. It seemed the Court's interest and intent was to obtain an estimate that could be
used as a step to help expedite a resolution of the case. As I stated in my letter to Mr. DeBry of
April 23, 2003 (see Exhibit A attached) in paragraph 4, "of course, as this matter progresses to the

point where damages are distributed to class members, we will perform additional testing to confirm
proper identification of class members and completeness of the data base". I concluded and still
believe that the work performed was sufficient to provide the Court with a reasonable estimate upon
which to make further decisions. As I noted in my March i, 2002 Report, the data base consists of
9,547 loans identified, which is a close approximation of the 9,648 estimated number based on
sampling procedures described in my December 31, 1996 Report to the Court. As I stated then, I
believe the comparability of these two numbers provides additional evidence of the overall
reasonableness and accuracy of the class member size.
Alleged Deception of the Court
The second issue presented by plaintiffs counsel and Mr. Conway is that 1 attempted to
deceive the Court by stating I had performed a limited amount of testing in relation to the loan
cards. As you are aware, at the request of plaintiff's counsel, I went to Prudential offices in
December 2000 where the loan cards are kept. I discussed with Mr. Slack the piocess he and his
staff followed to segregate the loan cards between potential class and non-clasj members I
obtained copies of 50 loan cards which I selected at random. I obtained 33 cards included in the
class, 17 cards which had been excluded. These loan cards contain information which identify
whether they are conventional, FHA, VA, or other types of loans. Based on obtaining this sample
of loan cards, and my discussions with Mr. Slack, I believed it appropriate to state I had
"performed a limited amount of testing". Mr. Conway's August 26, 2003 affidavit does not
dispute whether I performed any testing, but instead states "I can see absolutely no way that an
examination of fifty loan cards from a total universe of 70,000 loan cards, could in any way be
referred to as a 'limited amount of testing' sufficient to meet the standard of 'sufficient relevant
data' in the Consulting Services Standards" (emphasis added). 1 partially agree with Mr. Conway
that the limited testing performed may not meet a higher standard of evidential matter in an audit
engagement, however, I never have claimed to have performed sufficient test work to meet such a
standard. I have consistently stated the opposite, that only a limited amount of testing had been
done and more testing would be required!
In conclusion, I strongly believe I have not violated professional standards and have not
made any effort to deceive the Court in any way.
Respectfully submitted,

Edwin L. Erickson, CPA
ELE:cp
cc:

Stephen Tmgey
Joseph Palmer
Robert DeBry

April 23, 2003

Mr. Robert J. DeBry
Robert J. DeBry & Associates
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Dear Bob:
Your letter of April 8, 2003 asks six questions. My response is as follows:
1.

Difference between sample size of 400 and n-100. The original
sample selected by Prudential was 100 items, generated on
November 25, 1993. On January 5, 1994, an expanded sample of
400 loans was generated. My recollection of the reason to increase
the sample from 100 to 400 was due to the fact many of the loans
selected from the microfiche were not potentially class members,
since they were FHA, VA, construction, etc. type loans. The larger
sample was necessary to obtain a representative number of
conventional mortgages that would be potential class members. The
statistical parameters quoted on page 3 of my March 1, 2002 report
are based on the original sample of 100 which was subsequently
increased to 400. The parameters for the sample of 400 are
discussed in question 2 below.

2.

Estimate of aggregate damages of $1,004,152 per March L 2002
report versus X-HAT of $1,608,639. As discussed above,
Prudential's original statistical estimate based on a sample of 100
resulted in an estimate of $1,608,639, with a precision of $392,059,
resulting in an estimate range of $1,216,581 to $2,000,698 (See copy
of sample summary sheet attached). This sample summary includes
an interest component on the damages as well. As noted in our
December 31, 1996 report, the interest component at 10% was
$119.21 per class member, compared to damages of $105.18 per
class member. As noted in the December 31, 1996 report, our total
damage estimate (including interest) was $2,164,915. This amount
compares to Prudential's statistical estimate of $1,888,070, with an
estimated range of $1,675,577 to $2,100,563 (see iteration #6 on
attached sample summary). The main difference between the sample
estimate of $1,004,152 and the higher amounts estimated by
Prudential and by myself is the interest component, which was
excluded based on instructions from the Court for my March 1,
2002 report.
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3.

Precision of $392,059 and X-HAT of $1,608,639. As discussed
above, these sample parameters for the sample of 100 were picked up
in error. The parameters should have been a precision of $212,493
and an X-HAT of $1,888,070, based on the larger sample of 400.

4.

Testing of 14,482 data base of loan cards. In my March 1, 2002
report to the Court, I stated,"! have not yet performed testing to
determine if all loan cards have been properly segregated between
class members and non-members of the class". As indicated in my
December 27, 2000 letter to you, I met with Mr. Slack at that time
and reviewed with him the process he followed to segregate the loan
cards. He represented to me that he followed the criteria established
by the Court in determining class members. Of course, as this
matter progresses to the point where damages are distributed to class
members, we will perform additional testing to confirm proper
identification of class members and completeness of the data base.

5.

Request for data supporting average damage per loan of $105.18. I
apologize for not responding to this request. I thought Mr. Shaha
obtained this information when he met with Washington Mutual
representatives and reviewed the sample. I have attached a copy of
the five pages of the sample results. The totals at the bottom of the
fourth page agree to our December 31, 1996 report. The fifth page
totals include nonowner occupied loans such as thrift and loan
entities, etc. which were excluded. As in the past, I have covered the
names of the borrowers to preserve confidentiality.

6.

Testwork performed on Prudential sample. To test the sample
performed by Prudential, we tested every 20th loan in the sample, or
20 loans. For these 20 loans, we obtained the microfiche designated
by the random number generator program and verified the proper
loan was selected. We then obtained copies of the annual statement
summaries for each of the 20 loans for each year end from 1971 to
1979 for which the loan had activity. We then entered the monthly
escrow balances into a spreadsheet, using the formulas established
by the Court for the Madsen loan. We then compared the total
damages, including interest, from our spreadsheet for these loans to
the amount listed by Prudential in its sample summary. As
discussed previously, we found two minor errors, one which changed
the sample total slightly by $6.44. We revised the sample total
prepared by Prudential by the $6.44 and concluded we could rely on
the accuracy of the sample work performed by Prudential.
Sincerely,

Edwin L. Erickson, CPA
cc:

Stephen Tingey, Esq.
Joseph Palmer, Esq.
Honorable L.A. Dever
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY
MADSEN, his wife, for themselves and all
others similarly situated,

FINAL JUDGMENT

4*. 1S03~2'<oO'1&

Plaintiff,
Civil No.

C79-8404

v.
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK fsb
(successor to PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL
SAVINGS and LOAN ASSOCIATION),

Honorable L. A. Dever

Defendant.

It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that:
L

Judgment is entered against defendant Washington Mutual Bank fsb, successor to
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association in the amount of $1,004,153 as
the total lump sum damages and in favor of Nancy Madsen, in her capacity as
representative of a certified class of persons, similarly situated, consisting of the
borrowers on the 9,547 loans identified by the Special Master comprising a class
defined as borrowers (i) whose loan include a trust deed contaimng the pledge
language as in the Madsens' Trust Deed, as identified by the Special Master; (li)
who had any funds m escrow reserve budget accounts between March 3, 1971 and
June 30, 1979; (iii) whose loan was for a single-family, owner-occupied,
residential primary residence; (IV) whose loan originated in Utah; and (v) whose
mailing address and property address are identical on the Mortgage Loan Master
Reference Card, thereby establishing "primary residence." The actual names of
class members can be provided to the appellate court by supplemental filing if so
desired or requested by the appellate court.
Final Judgment @J

750226073

JD20293225
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK
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2.

The amount of the foregoing aggregate judgment to be received by class members
for each loan within the class is the cumulative net earnings on the average
escrow balance for that class member's loan, compounded for the period March 3,
1971 to June 30, 1979, arrived at by applying the following "net yield" for each
year:
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

3.17%
2.97%
6.01%
6.76%
4.59%
3.20%
3.95%
5.94%
8.89%

less attorneys' fees awarded to plaintiffs' counsel in the amount of 33.3% of the
foregoing.
3.

Defendant Washington Mutual Bank fsb shall pay post-judgment interest, at the
rate set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4, from the date of this Judgment, until
the amount of the aggregate is deposited in court, in cash or bond.

4.

Defendant Washington Mutual Bank fsb shall pay plaintiffs' costs to the extent
required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54, and as determined by the Court, in
the amount of

t<W t\VN

DATED P X f c ^ V
*

_,2006.
BY THE COURT:

4y^^r ******
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on June 19th, 2005, a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed
FINAL JUDGMENT was hand-delivered to the following:
Robert J. DeBry
DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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INTEREST ON MORTGAGE LOAN ACCOUNTS ACT
(§ 7-17-1 etseq. U.C.A., as amended by 1985)
7-17-1. Legislative intent.
It is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act govern the rights, duties
and liabilities of borrowers and lenders with respect to reserve accounts established
before and after the effective date of this act.
7-17-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Real estate loan" means any agreement providing for a loan secured by an interest
in real estate in this state containing a residential structure of not more than four housing
units, at least one of which is the primary residence of the borrower and includes, but is
not limited to, agreements secured by mortgages, trust deeds, and conditional land sales
contracts.
(2) "Borrower" means any person who becomes obligated on a real estate loan at the
time of origination of such loan and includes mortgagors, trustors under trust deeds and
vendees under conditional land sales contracts.
(3) "Lender" means any person who regularly makes, extends or holds real estate loans
and includes, but is not limited to, mortgagees, beneficiaries under trust deeds and
vendors under conditional land sales contracts and who regularly require or maintain
reserve accounts.
(4) "Person" includes an individual, a commercial bank, savings bank, building and
loan corporation, savings and loan association, credit union, investment company,
insurance company, pension fund, mortgage company, trust company, or any other
organization making real estate loans.
(5) "Reserve account" means any account, whether denominated escrow, impound,
trust, pledge, reserve or otherwise, which is established in connection with a loan secured
by an interest in real estate located in this state, whether or not a real estate loan as
defined in this chapter, and whether incorporated into the loan agreement or a separate
document, whereby the borrower agrees to make periodic prepayment to the lender or its
designee of taxes, insurance premiums or other charges pertaining to the property
securing the loan and the lender or its designee agrees to pay the taxes, insurance
Premiums or other charges out of the account on or before their due date.
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(6) "Service charge" means any direct fee imposed in connection with the
administration of a reserve account.
(7) A loan is "made" when the lender makes its initial disbursement of the loan
proceeds.
7-17-3. Lender to pay interest — Exceptions — Computation — Time for payment —
Service charges prohibited — Written agreement.
(1) Each lender requiring the establishment or continuance of a reserve account in
connection with an existing or future real estate loan shall pay interest on funds deposited
in the account of at least 5 1/4% simple interest per annum, unless:
(a) The reserve account is required by a governmental insurer or guarantor of the loan
as a condition of insurance or guaranty;
(b) The reserve account is maintained in connection with a real estate loan in an
original principal amount exceeding 80% of the lender's appraised value of the property at
the time the loan is made provided that when the principal balance of the loan is paid
down to 80% this exception shall not apply; or
(c) The payment of interest or other compensation to the borrower for the use of funds
deposited in a reserve account is prohibited by federal law or regulations.
(2) The interest shall be computed as of the end of the calendar year on the average of
the month end balances in the account for that calendar year or partial calendar year,
except that in the event of payoff of the real estate loan, interest shall be computed on the
average month end balances in the account for the partial year ending at the end of the
month preceding payoff. The interest shall, within 60 days after the end of each calendar
year, at the election of the lender, be credited to the remaining principal balance on the
loan, paid to the borrower, his successors or assigns, or credited to the reserve account,
except that in the event of payoff of the real estate loan, the interest shall be paid or
credited to the borrower, his successors or assigns within 30 days after the date of payoff.
(3) No lender shall require or impose a service charge for the administration of a reserve
account.
(4) Except as provided in this section, no lender shall be obligated to pay interest on or
account for the earnings from funds in any reserve account in connection with the real
estate loan made or held after June 30, 1979, unless an agreement in writing expressly so
providing was executed by the borrower and lender.
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7-17-4. Options in lieu of reserve account — Notice by lender — Selection by
borrower — Noninterest-bearing reserve account.
(1) A lender not requiring the establishment and maintenance of a reserve account shall
offer the borrower the following options:
(a) The borrower may elect to maintain a non-interest-bearing reserve account to be
serviced by the lender at no charge to the borrower; or
(b) The borrower may manage the payment of insurance premiums, taxes and other
charges for his own account.
(2) The lender shall give written notice of the options to the borrower: (i) with respect to
real estate loans existing on the effective date by notice mailed not more than 30 days
after the effective date; (ii) with respect to real estate loans made on or after the effective
date by notice given at or prior to the closing of the loan. The notice shall clearly describe
the options and state that a reserve account is not required by the lender, that the borrower
is legally responsible for the payment of taxes, insurance premiums and other charges and
that the notice is being given pursuant to this act. For real estate loans in existence on the
effective date the borrower must select one of the options prior to 60 days after the
effective date. If no option is selected prior to 60 days after the effective date the
borrower will be deemed to have selected option (a), provided, however, that the
borrower at a later time may select option (b). For loans made on or after the effective
date the borrower shall select one of the options at the closing. If the borrower selects
option (a), the lender shall not be required to account for earnings, if any, on the account.
(3) If the borrower who selects option (b), or his successors or assigns, fails to pay the
taxes, insurance premiums or other charges pertaining to the property securing the loan
prior to the delinquency date for such payments, the lender may require a reserve account
without interest or other compensation for the use of the funds; provided, that the lender
may not require a reserve account without interest or other compensation if (a) the
borrower pays any delinquency within 30 days and (b) the borrower has not previously
been delinquent in payment of taxes, insurance premiums or other charges.
7-17-5. Statements.
Every lender shall furnish to the borrower, or his successors or assigns, without charge,
within 60 days after the end of each calendar year, an itemized statement showing moneys
(1) received for interest and principal repayment and (2) received and held in or disbursed
from a reserve account, if any.
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7-17-6. Liability of lender for failure to pay taxes, insurance premiums or other
charges.
A lender administering a reserve account shall make timely payments of taxes, insurance
premiums and other charges for which the account is established, if funds paid into the
account by the borrower, his successors or assigns, are sufficient for the payments.
Negligent failure to make the payments required for taxes, insurance premiums and other
charges as they become due, from available funds in the reserve account, shall subject the
lender to liability for all damages directly resulting from the failure; provided that this
sentence shall not deprive the lender of the right to present any defense it may have in any
action brought to enforce the liability. Failure of the borrower or his successors or assigns
to deliver promptly to the lender all notices of tax assessments and insurance premiums or
other charges, received by the borrower, his successors or assigns, shall relieve the lender
from liability under this section.
7-17-7. Limit on amount borrower required to pay into account — Deficiency —
Method of recouping and remedies for default.
No lender in connection with a real estate loan shall require a borrower, his successors
or assigns, or a prospective borrower:
(1) to deposit in any reserve account established in connection with the loan, prior to or
upon closing, a sum exceeding the estimated total payments for taxes, insurance
premiums or other charges which will be due and payable on the date of closing, and the
pro rata portion thereof which has accrued, plus 1/12th of the estimated total taxes,
insurance premiums and other charges which will become due and payable during the
12-month period beginning on the date of closing; or
(2) to deposit in any reserve account in any month beginning after closing a sum
exceeding 1/12th of the total estimated taxes, insurance premiums, or other charges which
will become due and payable during the 12-month period beginning on the first day of the
month, except that:
(a) If the lender determines there will be a deficiency on the due date, it may require
additional monthly deposits in the reserve account of pro rata portions of the deficiency
corresponding to the number of months from the date of the lender's determination of the
deficiency to the date upon which the charges become due and payable;
(b) If the lender determines there is a deficiency on or after the due date, it may bill the
borrower, his successors or assigns, for the deficiency, which bill shall promptly be paid,
or pay the deficiency, add that amount to the principal, or charge the reserve account, and
require additional monthly deposits in the reserve account over the next 12 months to
4

recoup the deficiency. If the borrower, his successors or assigns, fails to pay any amount
billed by the lender to meet the deficiency, the lender may exercise any remedies for
default contained in the real estate loan document. If such failure to pay continues for 30
days after written notice to borrower, the lender may also terminate any obligation to pay
interest or to otherwise pay compensation for the use of the funds in the reserve account.
7-17-8. Damages for lender's violation of act — Limitations on recovery.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, a lender who violates this act is liable to the
borrower, his successors or assigns, for the actual damages suffered by the borrower, his
assigns or successors, or $100, whichever is greater. If an action is commenced, the
prevailing party may be awarded reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the court.
(2) A lender has no liability under this section if the court finds that written demand for
payment of the claim of the borrower, his successors or assigns, was made on the lender
not less than 30 days before commencement of the action and that the lender tendered to
the borrower, his successors or assigns, prior to the commencement of the action, an
amount not less than the damages awarded.
(3) A lender may not be held liable under this section for a violation of this act if the
lender shows that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures to avoid such errors.
(4) A reserve account established or maintained in violation of this act is voidable, at the
option of the borrower, his successors or assigns, at any time, but shall not otherwise
affect the validity of the loan, the security interest in the real property or any other
obligation of the borrower.
(5) No action under this section may be brought more than one year after the date of the
violation.
7-17-9. Actions on accounts established prior to 1979 — Limitations on recovery.
(1) With respect to any reserve account established prior to July 1, 1979 and for which
no legal action is pending as of January 1, 1979, no recovery shall be had in any action
brought to require payment of interest on, or other compensation for, the use prior to July
1, 1979, of the funds in such account unless:
(a) An agreement in writing expressly so providing was executed by the borrower and
the lender; or
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(b) The borrower, or his successors or assigns, establishes by clear and convincing
evidence an agreement between the parties that the lender would pay interest on or to
otherwise compensate the borrower for the use of the funds in such account. Use in the
loan documents of such words as "trusf'or "pledge" alone shall not establish the intent of
the parties; and
(c) There is no federal law or regulation prohibiting the payment of interest on or
otherwise compensating the borrower for the use of the funds in such an account.
(2) No action seeking payment of interest on or other compensation for the use of the
funds in any reserve account for any period prior to July 1, 1979, shall be brought after
June 30, 1981. Any recovery in any such action shall be limited to the four-year period
immediately preceding the commencement of the action. No recovery shall be had in
respect of any reserve account established prior to July 1, 1979 greater than if the
provisions of Section 7-17-3 of this act were applicable to such accounts.
(3) With respect to any reserve account established prior to July 1, 1979, an agreement
in writing between the lender and the borrower, or his successors or assigns, that (a) the
provisions of Section 7-17-3 of this act shall apply to all payments made subsequent to
July 1, 1979, or (b) the borrower may exercise, for the period subsequent to July 1, 1979,
either of the options provided in Section 7-17-4 of this act, shall bar any recovery by the
borrower, his successors or assigns, for interest on or other compensation for the use of
the funds in such account for any period prior to July 1, 1979.
7-17-10. Applicability of act to accounts and actions thereon.
The provisions of this act shall apply:
(1) to all reserve accounts; and
(2) to all actions filed after January 1, 1979, to recover interest on or other
compensation for the use of the funds in any reserve account whether or not the reserve
accounts were established prior to or subsequent to July 1, 1979.
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